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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION

THE DECISION TO DECENTRALIZE GOOD PROVISION IN THE UNITED
STATES: A STUDY IN CLEAN ENERGY POLICY
Normative economic theory provides justification for at least partially centralized
renewable energy provision due to the large, positive externalities associated with
renewable energy production. However, the United States is one of the few countries
without centralized renewable energy policy. Instead, the federal government actively
chooses decentralized renewable energy provision by using fiscal transfers to support
subnational renewable energy development. This dissertation explores why U.S. legislators
choose decentralized renewable energy provision by asking two primary questions. First,
what is the motivation for using federal fiscal transfers for decentralized renewable energy
output considering what we know about positive spillovers and market failure associated
with decentralized renewable energy production? Second, do fiscal transfers for
decentralized renewable energy provision increase renewable energy production at the
local level? The theoretical model proposed in Chapter Four posits why policymakers
choose decentralized renewable energy provision. The chapter argues that the current
political price associated with a specific policy issue affects legislators’ choices regarding
good provision. I hypothesize that when the political price associated with vying for
centralized good provision is high, legislators are incentivized to choose decentralized
good provision. Chapter Five applies this theory to empirically evaluate the choice to
decentralize renewable energy provision. The chapter examines whether the current
political price of renewable energy policy affects the likelihood of a legislator proposing
decentralized funding for renewable energy provision. I hypothesize that legislators will
propose funding to support decentralized renewable energy development when the political
price associated with renewable energy policies is high at a given time. The results show
that when the political price of renewable energy policy is low, a policymaker is less likely
to use grants to support renewable energy projects, finding support for the hypothesis.
Chapter Six empirically evaluates the effectiveness of renewable energy grants at the local
level to further understand the theoretical model proposed in Chapter Four. I hypothesize
that receiving a renewable energy grant increases renewable energy output at the local
level. The results support this hypothesis by showing that receiving a renewable energy
grant is associated with significant and positive increases in solar energy production. These

findings provide further insight into legislative decision-making and the role of renewable
energy grants in renewable energy development in the U.S.
KEYWORDS: Energy Policy, Energy Grants, Fiscal Federalism, Fiscal Transfers,
Legislative Decision Making
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION
1.1 Grants for Decentralized Renewable Energy in the U.S.
The U.S. federal government distributes fiscal transfers to subnational governments to
support decentralized renewable energy development. The U.S. Department of Energy
(DOE) allocated $250 million in renewable energy and energy efficiency grants to state
and local governments in fiscal year 2017 (“Table 12.3,” 2019). 1 The DOE’s Office of
Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy awards competitive and formula grants for
energy efficiency and renewable energy to state and local governments through the State
Energy Program. The office also awards block grants to local communities through the
Energy Efficiency and Conservation Block Grant Program. Other federal fiscal transfers
for renewable energy and energy efficiency occurred through the American Recovery and
Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA) during President Obama’s administration. ARRA
invested $31 billion total in clean energy mostly through fiscal transfers for clean energy
projects (“Recovery Act,” n.d.). Additionally, other federal agencies offer temporary and
ongoing grant programs for small-scale renewable energy projects. 2
The use of federal fiscal transfers in the U.S. to promote decentralized renewable
energy provision is unique compared to centralized renewable energy provision in other
countries. This anomaly provides motivation to ask why U.S. federal policymakers
choose decentralized renewable energy provision and whether this approach is effective
at increasing renewable energy output. Most countries in Europe and several in Asia have

1

This amount does not include renewable energy grants through other federal departments.
For example, the U.S. Department of Agriculture offers the Rural Energy for America Program to provide
grants to agricultural producers and small, rural businesses for renewable energy systems, among other
things. Another example, the National Science Foundation, frequently offers Science and Technology and
other Research and Development grants that allow for renewable energy development. Funding
announcements are posted to Grants.gov.
2

1

feed-in tariffs, payments made to individual renewable energy producers (“Global
Renewable Energy,” 2017). European countries have adopted green certificate programs,
utilizing tradeable certificates to award renewable energy production and penalizing
energy producers for not meeting a specific renewable energy production threshold, such
as the Green Certificate Program in Norway and Sweden and the Renewables Obligation
policy in the United Kingdom. Countries in South America and Russia have capacity
auctions for renewable energy that allow contracts for renewable energy production. On
the other hand, comprehensive renewable energy policy in the U.S. has failed while the
federal government supports decentralized renewable energy development.

1.2 A Case for Centralized Renewable Energy
The current literature provides the foundation to explore the motivation to decentralize
renewable energy in the U.S. and the effectiveness of renewable energy grants. Scholars
argue for centralized renewable energy provision in the U.S. Laird and Stefes (2009)
explain that the U.S. has an advantage compared to other counties regarding availability
of natural resources and advanced technology to develop renewable energy systems.
Studies also point out that the majority of the public has supported federal involvement in
renewable energy policy since the 1970s (Stoutenborough et al., 2014; Laird and Stefes,
2009; Farhar, 1994). According to a survey by the Yale Program on Climate Change
Communication, approximately 71 to 89 percent of a county’s residents support funding
for renewable energy research, and an average of 80 percent of a county’s residents
support funding for renewable energy development (Howe et al., 2015).

2

1.2.1 Positive Spillovers and Market Failure with Renewable Energy Production
Climate and energy scholars talk extensively about positive externalities associated with
renewable energy, arguing for centralized provision of renewable energy policy. Climate
sustainability is most commonly discussed, because renewable energy produces less
greenhouse gas emissions than fossil fuel energy. Thus, renewable energy production
results in cleaner air and climate mitigation (Brown, 2001; Menanteau et al., 2003; Longo
et al., 2008; Roe et al., 2001; Wiser, 2007; Goett et al., 2000; Batley et al., 2001; Beck
and Martinot, 2004). Public health is also a positive externality of renewable energy
production. Switching from fossil fuel energy to renewable energy has a positive impact
on the environment, resulting in cleaner air and water sources for human consumption
(Longo et al., 2008; Beck and Martinot, 2004; Roe et al., 2001; Wiser, 2007; Goett et al.,
2000; Batley et al., 2001). Beck and Martinot (2004) add that renewable energy is less
harmful to forests and fisheries. Finally, new technology investments and research
provides information and innovation externalities for other energy producers (Jaffe et al.,
2004; Beck and Martinot, 2004).
Scholars make the case that marketc failure has created an undersupply of
renewable energy production and distortions in pricing (e.g. Beck and Martinot, 2004;
Menanteau et al., 2003; Brown, 2001). Beck and Martinot (2004) provide a detailed
discussion of market barriers to renewable energy consumption and development,
arguing that the markets “unfairly discriminate against renewable energy” (p.366). They
argue that market prices for renewable energy fail to account for several benefits of
renewable energy compared to fossil fuel energy, including no variable fuel costs; shorter

3

transmission distances; and environmental and public health externalities. 3 Painuly
(2001) argues this creates a free-rider problem with renewable energy investments.
Furthermore, Beck and Martinot point out that fossil fuels are subsidized, which are
politically difficult to remove.4 Subsidies for fossil fuels make fossil fuel energy an
artificially cheaper choice of energy as the market prices do not account for the negative
externalities associated with fossil fuel energy production. Therefore, market failure for
both renewable energy and fossil fuel energy arises from property rights to environmental
and public health goods that are not clearly defined or enforced.
In addition to issues with market prices, renewable energy cannot currently
compete with fossil fuel energy due to other barriers. First, there are large upfront capital
costs associated with renewable energy investments. The energy infrastructure in the
United States is primarily set up for the fossil fuel industry, and transitioning away from
this infrastructure will impose significant costs on investors (Longo et al. 2008; Painuly
2001). Beck and Martinot (2004) discuss additional market performance and legal and
regulatory barriers. They argue that a greater perception of risks associated with
renewable energy and an information and skills deficit can hinder investments. Finally,
legal and regulatory barriers discriminate against renewable energy. Examples include
interconnection requirements that are burdensome or inconsistent for installation of

3

Scholars also argue that market prices do not accurately capture the externalities associated with
renewable energy (e.g. Beck and Martinot, 2004; Menanteau et al., 2003; Brown, 2001; Painuly, 2001).
4
According to the US Energy Information Administration, renewable energy received approximately $6.7
billion in subsidies in fiscal year 2016 (“Federal Financial Interventions,” 2018). Tax expenditures
accounted for 80 percent of subsidies, and the other 20 percent was from research and development, the
DOE’s Loan Guarantee Program, and direct expenditures. Subsidies declined from approximately $15.5
billion in fiscal year 2010, which was primarily due to the expiration of the American Recovery and
Reinvestment Act subsidies for renewable energy. In fiscal year 2016, coal received approximately $1.3
billion in subsidies, and 72% was from tax expenditures. Nuclear energy received $365 million in that year.
This amount does not include all subsides to fossil fuels or fossil fuel-related activities.

4

renewable energy technology in homes and businesses; lack of procedures for
installation; and restricted transmission access by current standards. The market has not
overcome these barriers in part because it does not take into account positive externalities
of renewable energy. However, states can implement state-level and negotiate regional
policies to allow and encourage local renewable energy production (Fischlein et al.,
2014).
Studies in fiscal federalism discuss the effectiveness of centralized provision of
goods that create large spillovers and are underprovided in the market. In general, the
federal government typically provides environmental goods as they produce positive
externalities (Oates and Portney, 2003).5 In addition to positive externalities, Oates
(2008) explains that local governments typically abide by centralized environmental
policies, even if they impose uniform requirements on heterogeneous governments.
Finally, there are sometimes economies of scale with centralized provision since the
federal government typically has greater financial and informational resources relative to
local governments (Musgrave 1961; Oates 1972; Oates 2008). Economies of scale is
especially advantageous when goods require large investments in research and
development.

1.2.2 Insufficient Subnational Policies
Studies find mixed results on the effectiveness of subnational clean energy policies (e.g.
Carley 2009; Menz and Vachon 2006; Delmas and Montes-Sanchos 2011). Scholars note
the benefits of local energy policies but generally agree that federal policy would be more

5

The Clean Air Act and the Clean Water Act are two examples of centralized environmental policies in the
U.S.

5

effective in developing renewable energy in the U.S. (Sovacool, 2009). 6 Disparate
renewable energy policies across jurisdictions are not necessarily efficient. Local
governments are not equipped to internalize the externalities imposed by local policies, as
greenhouse gas emissions and savings are not contained within jurisdictional borders.
This is inefficient when local governments produce disproportionate spillovers on
neighboring localities (Ogawa and Wildasin, 2009). Local renewable energy policies can
also cause carbon leakage, the increase in emissions in one jurisdiction from energy
producers who move from another jurisdiction with stricter emissions policies. However,
scholars suggest that policy design can influence the amount of carbon leakage from local
policies (Böhringer et al., 2017; Carley, 2011).

1.3 Explanations for Federal Inaction
Scholars speculate that the federal government’s unwillingness to adopt a centralized
renewable energy policy is largely due to politics. A plausible explanation for
decentralized renewable energy development is that renewable energy is regarded as the
primary solution to climate change (Moniz, 2015). Therefore, renewable energy policy
could be subjected to the same political conflicts as climate change policy. The
differences in congressional voting on environmental issues, especially climate change,
have become increasingly polarized among Republicans and Democrats (Krosnick et al.,
2000, Fiorina and Abrams 2008, Dunlap and McCright, 2008). These studies help to

6

Sovacool (2009) argues that the most effective method to promote renewable energy and energy
efficiency is a comprehensive federal approach to include a federal feed-in tariff, wealth redistribution to
lower income households, and federal funding for education and energy management. These conclusions
are based on a survey of energy experts from types of electricity companies; regulatory agencies; energy
manufacturers; interest groups including nonprofits; and consumers and consumer advocates.

6

explain why the federal government has not adopted a centralized renewable energy
policy. This dissertation builds on this literature by focusing on federal policymakers’
decisions to financially support decentralized renewable energy development.

1.4 Dissertation Outline
This dissertation focuses on the motivation to choose decentralized renewable energy
provision in the United States as revealed by decision makers’ policy choices. Scholars
argue for some central provision of renewable energy given its large positive externalities
and market failure. However, the United States is one of few countries without a
centralized renewable policy. Instead, the federal government chooses decentralization by
using fiscal transfers to support subnational policies and investments. To my knowledge,
no study has specifically considered the motivation to use renewable energy grants,
which are unique given the arguments for centralized clean energy policy. Instead, energy
scholars study effectiveness of subnational renewable energy policies (e.g. Carley, 2009;
Menz and Vachon, 2006). Other studies focus on the optimal choice between
centralization and decentralization (e.g. Besley and Coate, 2003; Lockwood, 2005), and
numerous studies consider effectiveness of federal fiscal transfers.
I contribute to the literature by focusing on two questions: First, what motivates
federal legislators to propose fiscal transfers for decentralized renewable energy
development considering what we know about positive spillovers and market failure
associated with renewable energy investments? Besley and Coate (2003) argue that
studying political decision-making furthers our understanding of the centralizationdecentralization tradeoff. Second, does the United States’ unique strategy of using fiscal

7

transfers for renewable energy provision effectively increase renewable energy output? I
rely on studies in economics for the theoretical foundation to explore these two questions.
Chapter Two defines renewable energy, discussing the development and
prevalence of solar, wind, hydroelectric, geothermal, and biomass energy separately. The
chapter briefly explains decentralized residential and commercial renewable energy
systems in the U.S. and the magnitude of these developments. Then the discussion
continues on energy policy at the federal and subnational levels. The chapter explains the
federal and subnational policies and actions that have contributed to decentralized
renewable energy development in the U.S. The discussion explains that subnational
governments have adopted financial incentives and regulations to encourage renewable
energy development while the federal government has partially supported subnational
renewable energy development with financial incentives, including fiscal transfers for
renewable energy.
Chapter Three reviews the fiscal federalism literature that discusses the
centralization-decentralization tradeoff. The chapter provides an overview of the three
primary levels of government—the national government, states, and local governments—
describing the purpose and functions of each level as they are discussed in the literature.
The chapter then focuses on the tradeoff between centralization and decentralization,
outlining the advantages and disadvantages of each type of public provision. This leads to
the discussion of the purpose and effectiveness of intergovernmental fiscal transfers,
which the federal government uses to encourage decentralized provision. The chapter
concludes with implications for renewable energy grants in the U.S.

8

Chapter Four proposes a theoretical model to explain why legislators choose
decentralized public provision for goods with large spillovers. The theoretical foundation
begins with legislative bargaining models that show how strategic behavior affects public
provision. Following the literature, I assume that legislators respond to institutional
incentives by showing that the political price associated with proposed policies affects
legislators’ choices. I theorize that the utility-maximizing choice for legislators is to
choose decentralized output when the political price associated with a specific proposal
for centralized output is high. The model is then used to explain why legislators choose to
fund decentralized renewable energy in the U.S. despite normative economic justification
for centralized provision.
Chapter Five offers a direct empirical test of the theoretical model proposed in
Chapter Four. I hypothesize that when there is a low political price associated with
renewable energy policymaking, legislators are less likely to propose funding for
decentralized renewable energy. To test this hypothesis, I look at the first observable
moment in the legislative decision-making process: bills introduced in Congress by
legislators. I analyze a sample of renewable energy bills introduced during the 103 rd to
113th Congresses to observe whether legislators proposed funding for centralized or
decentralized renewable energy. Using a proxy variable for low political price, I run a
linear probability model to estimate a legislator’s likelihood of including funding for
decentralized renewable energy. The findings suggest that legislators are less likely to
propose a bill that includes funding for decentralized renewable energy development
when the political price of renewable energy policymaking is low. Robustness checks

9

offer weak support for this finding and suggest that this result is unique to renewable
energy provision.
Chapter Six offers an additional empirical test to evaluate the theoretical model
proposed in Chapter Four, which explains that legislators choose to invest in
decentralized renewable energy when the political price of renewable energy
policymaking is high. I assume that reelection and a good’s output at the local level
increase under decentralized provision of renewable energy. Therefore, I hypothesize that
renewable energy grants increase renewable energy output at the local level. I test this
hypothesis by empirically evaluating the impact of one-time renewable energy grants
distributed through the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act on renewable energy
production at the county-level. I find support that renewable energy production increases
at the local level, at least for solar energy. Additional empirical evaluation suggests that
these results are the most significant in warmer climate regions, as expected, but are not
affected by state or regional policies.
Chapter seven concludes the dissertation by providing an overview and the
contributions of each chapter. The chapter concludes by discussing how the findings in
this dissertation can be extended to future studies.

10

CHAPTER TWO: AN OVERVIEW OF RENEWABLE ENERGY
IN THE U.S.
2.1 An Introduction to Renewable Energy
Renewable energy refers to energy generated by naturally occurring and replenishing
resources (“Renewable Energy Explained,” 2018). Examples include solar, wind,
hydroelectric, geothermal, and biomass waste energy. Renewable resources that emit
heat, such as solar or geothermal energy, can be consumed directly. Renewable resources
can also power turbines or similar structures to create energy, which is then turned into
electricity by a generator. Renewable energy technology can be installed on a residential
property or industrial scale, powering individual homes, businesses, or communities.
Renewable energy resources are disbursed unevenly across the United States. Each state
has at least one type of renewable energy source (Aslani and Wong, 2014). The following
paragraphs briefly describe each main type of renewable energy source (biomass,
geothermal, hydroelectricity, solar, and wind), including which regions in the United
States are the most optimal for producing each type of energy. 7
Biomass energy is derived from organic material from plants and animals and is
primarily converted to biofuels (ethanol) (“Renewable Energy Explained,” 2018).
Biomass is broken down by burning it directly or burning byproducts to release heat,
which can be used directly or indirectly to generate electricity. Examples of biomass
include wood and wood waste; municipal solid waste, landfill gas and biogas, ethanol,
and biodiesel. The availability of biomass energy varies by type, but every state has the
potential to utilize at least one type.

7

In this context, optimal describes an area where the greatest amount of the resource can be utilized
relative to other areas. For example, optimal areas for solar energy are areas where the most amount of
sunlight can be accessed.
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Geothermal technology utilizes heat from underneath the earth’s surface.
Geothermal heat is used to generate steam from water or another liquid or to heat water
(“Renewable Energy Explained,” 2018). Steam and water can then be used directly to
heat buildings or can be used to power a turbine to generate electricity. The west and
southwestern regions in the United States are optimal locations for geothermal energy,
but geothermal energy resources can be found in many regions including mountainous
areas.
Hydroelectricity is generated from moving water that powers a turbine, which is
then used to generate electricity. Hydroelectric technology exists in almost every region
as it can be installed in rivers, dams, and oceans. Hydroelectricity is the most prevalent
and among the oldest forms of energy (“Energy from Moving Water,” 2017).
Solar photovoltaic (PV) converts sunlight into electricity, often through solar
panels. Concentrated solar power (CSP) technology uses mirrors to reflect sunlight,
which is then captured and converted into heat (“Renewable Energy Explained,” 2018).
The solar heat is used to make electricity. All states have potential for some solar
photovoltaic (PV) power energy, although there is very little in most northern states
across the U.S. The greatest potential for solar PV is in most southern states including
Texas; along the west coast; and in the Great Plains, West, and Southwest regions.
Concentrated solar power is optimal primarily in the southwestern region of the U.S. and
surrounding areas.
Wind powers a turbine, which creates energy to convert electricity (“Renewable
Energy Explained,” 2018). Open areas without windbreaks are some of the most
resourceful areas for wind energy production. Wind farms can be installed onshore and
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offshore, including tops of rounded hills, open bodies of water, and gaps in mountains
where wind funnels through intensely. The majority of wind energy potential is located in
and surrounding the Great Plains area and along oceanic coastlines.

2.2 Renewable Energy Production in the United States
Renewable energy systems in the United States are mostly developed locally. Consumers
can install renewable energy power directly into residential or commercial buildings.
Examples include rooftop solar panels and individual geothermal heat pumps. Larger,
industrial renewable energy systems, can be installed by local governments, businesses,
or organizations. Examples include wind or solar farms, which include several individual
generating units. The latitude to install and utilize renewable energy depends on the
processes for permitting and approving installation in each jurisdiction. States have
primary authority over the electricity market (Schragger, 2016; Fischlein et al., 2014;
Sautter and Twaite, 2009). Therefore, large-scale renewable energy operations are subject
to the same permitting process as other energy systems. Utility companies also have
control over the ability of renewable energy systems to connect to the power grid and are
responsible for the associated fee structures, which vary by provider. Ultimately, the
potential for renewable energy development in an area depends on existing energy
infrastructure and its capacity to incorporate renewable energy sources.
While individual consumers can install renewable energy systems on homes and
businesses, renewable energy is also produced by power plants dispersed across the
United States. Generally, renewable energy power plants generate more renewable power
than individual residential or commercial systems. The location of renewable energy
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power plants varies by location and type of renewable energy produced. Renewable
energy plants cover most states but are more sparsely disbursed across the west (U.S.
Energy Mapping System, 2019). Hydropower plants are the most dispersed of all
renewable energy power plants. Geothermal power plants are the most concentrated,
existing only in the West. Biomass and solar power plants are dispersed throughout the
United States but are less concentrated across the Midwest. Finally, wind power plants
are heavily concentrated in the Midwest and northeast. Appendix A shows the
distribution of renewable energy power plants by type of energy as of March 2019 in the
48 contiguous states.
Power plants can produce energy from several types of energy sources, although
power plants generally have one predominant energy source. As of December 2017, there
were 1,458 power plants with conventional hydroelectricity as the predominant source
and 4,174 power plants with another type of renewable energy as the predominant source
(“Electric Power Annual 2017,” 2018). For comparison, natural gas was the predominant
energy source for 1,820 power plants, and petroleum was the predominant energy source
for 1,080 power plants. Although there are several renewable power plants, renewable
energy still accounts for a small percentage of total energy produced in the United States.
In 2017, renewable energy accounted for 17 percent of electricity generation at utility
facilities, whereas natural gas, coal, and nuclear accounted for 32.1, 29.9, and 20 percent,
respectively (“What is U.S. electricity,” n.d.). Table 1 shows the share of total electricity
produced by each type of renewable energy in the U.S. Hydropower, one of the oldest
utilized forms of renewable energy, accounted for the largest share of electricity
generated at utilities from renewable sources. Wind energy, the second largest share of
14

renewable energy, is one of the most widespread renewable energies in the U.S.
(Fischlein et al., 2014).
Table 2.1
Percentage of U.S. Electricity Generation by Utilities in 2017
by Renewable Energy Source
Renewable Energy Source
Percentage of Total Electricity
Hydropower
7.4%
Wind
6.3%
Biomass
1.6%
Solar
1.3%
Geothermal
0.4%
Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration

2.3 Federal Renewable Energy Policies
The federal government has adopted few renewable energy regulations. Currently, there
are federal energy goals and regulations for federal buildings set in place by the Energy
Policy Act (EPAct) of 2005, which were subsequently expanded and updated by the
Energy Independence and Security Act (EISA) of 2007 and executive orders in 2009 and
2015 (“Green Power Purchasing,” 2018). The goals specify targets for energy reduction.
The requirements set guidelines for building design for energy efficiency and options to
invest in renewable energy. The Clean Power Plan, adopted in 2015 during President
Barack Obama’s administration, was an attempt at a centralized policy to reduce
greenhouse gas emissions. The plan set requirements for carbon emissions for each state,
listing renewable energy as one option to achieve requirements (“The Clean Power Plan,”
2017). The Clean Power Plan was repealed by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
during Present Donald Trump’s administration and never went into effect (“Proposal:
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Affordable Clean Energy,” 2018).8 Although these federal policies incorporate renewable
energy, none currently support renewable energy development directly.
The federal government also offers financial incentives for businesses and
individuals to encourage renewable energy investments. Some are tax credits
administered through the U.S. Internal Revenue Service (IRS). Examples include the
Renewable Electricity Production Tax Credit (PTC), a tax credit for businesses for
investing in renewable energy, and the Residential Renewable Energy Tax Credit, a tax
credit for investments in residential energy technologies (“Green Power Purchasing,”
2018). Loans, another common financial incentive offered by the federal government, are
administered through federal agencies such as the IRS, U.S. Department of Energy
(DOE), and U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA). Financial incentives may have
declining benefits or sunset dates. Laird and Stefes (2009) argue that sunset dates for
wind energy financial incentives were correlated with a decline in wind energy
development. However, there is no study to my knowledge on the effects of sunset dates
or financial incentives on total renewable energy development.
This dissertation focuses on another type of financial incentive: federal grants to
support renewable energy investments by states, local governments, and tribes. Most
fiscal transfers for renewable energy are awarded through two main programs within the
DOE. The State Energy Program, the largest grant program, uses regional and state
offices to provide funding and technical support to states to assist with energy
conservation and alternative energy development. This program’s purpose is to reduce
fossil fuel emissions and energy use and to increase energy efficiency through

8

In August 2018, the Trump administration proposed to replace the Clean Power Plan with the Affordable
Clean Energy (ACE), which would reduce greenhouse emissions from existing coal power plants.
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investments in energy efficiency and renewable energy. The State Energy Program has
awarded at least $300 million to states and territories since 2010 (“About the State
Energy Program,” 2019). The Energy Efficiency and Conservation Block Program
awards grants to subnational governments. The program was created with funding from
ARRA in 2009 to provide grants and technical assistance to develop renewable energy
and increase energy efficiency (“Program Evaluation,” 2015).
The federal government increased grants to states through ARRA. The §1603
energy grant program was one component of a total energy package to expand clean
energy by offering cash payments for investments in wind, residential and nonresidential
solar, biomass, geothermal, and other types of renewable energy (“Overview and Status
Update,” 2017). As of March 2017, the grant program contributed $25.7 billion to fund
105,972 renewable energy projects, which accounted for about 22% of total project
investments. Part of the funding went to expand the DOE’s two major programs: ARRA
allocated $3.1 billion through the State Energy Program for formula grants and $3.2
billion through the Energy Efficiency and Conservation Block Program (“Energy
Efficiency and Conservation,” n.d.). 9
Figure 2 shows total outlays to state and local governments for energy efficiency
and renewable energy.10 In 2008, approximately $39.7 million was awarded to

9

Although the State Energy Program and the Energy Efficiency and Conservation Block Grant Programs
are two of the largest programs, there are other programs that offer smaller federal awards for
renewable energy. For example, the DOE’s Tribal Energy Program Grant offers energy grants to tribes
residing on tribal lands. The USDA offers at least one grant program to all levels of government, tribes,
schools, agriculture, industry, and other organizations for renewable energy investments and
development.
10
This figure includes only grants awarded through the U.S. Department of Energy.

17

subnational governments for energy efficiency and renewable energy. Energy efficiency
and renewable energy fiscal transfers peaked in 2011 at approximately $5.1 billion,
corresponding with the distribution of ARRA’s §1603 energy grants. Energy efficiency
and renewable energy grants declined to approximately $418.2 million in 2013 and
remained relatively steady in subsequent years. Total energy grants for energy efficiency
and renewable energy were less than one percent of total transfers to state and local
governments in all years.
Figure 2.1
Outlays for Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy Grants to
State and Local Governments, 2008 to 2018
$6
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Note: Data are adjusted for inflation and are not available prior to 2008. The amount for 2018 is
estimated.
Source: Office of Management and Budget, “Table 12.3”

2.4 Decentralized Renewable Energy Policies
Perhaps the lack of federal action has spurred decentralized renewable energy in the
United States (Rabe, 2008). State and local governments have been adopting a variety of
renewable energy policies primarily since the 1990s, although some were adopted as
early as the 1970s (Bromley-Trujillo et al., 2016). Financial incentives to encourage
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investments are the most commonly adopted types of policies (Aslani and Wong 2014).
Examples include monetary incentives, such as tax incentives, rebates, grants, and loans
for renewable energy equipment or investments. States also adopt regulations to mandate
requirements for levels or types of renewable energy production. 11 Examples include
renewable portfolio standards, net metering, and interconnection standards (Carley,
2011).12 Furthermore, local governments sometimes collaborate with each other or with
nonprofit organization or businesses to pass renewable energy policies. However, the
types of renewable energy policies adopted by subnational governments vary by
jurisdiction. There has been no nationwide, collaborative effort to adopt policies that
coalesce to develop clean energy in the United States.
The next chapter turns to the fiscal federalism literature to understand the
motivation for using grants for public provision. Chapter Three reviews studies in fiscal
federalism to discuss the role of the federal government and subnational levels of
government from a normative economic perspective. The chapter also explains the
purpose of fiscal transfers and evidence on their effectiveness at increasing a good’s
output. The chapter concludes by discussing how lessons from the literature can be
applied to renewable energy provision.

11

Renewable portfolio standards (RPS), a requirement for a percentage of energy to be produced from
renewable sources, are the most common type of regulations adopted by states. As of February 2019, RPS
were adopted by 29 U.S. states, D.C., and three U.S. territories (“State Renewable Portfolio Standards”
2019). An additional eight states and one territory adopted a voluntary renewable energy target.
12
Net metering requires utilities to credit energy producers for energy contributed to the power grid
(DSIRE 2019). Energy producers can use credits at a later date when the system does not produce energy.
Interconnection standards determine how renewable energy suppliers connect to the power grid.
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CHAPTER THREE: A LITERATURE REVIEW ON THE
CENTRALIZATION-DECENTRALIZATION TRADEOFF
3.1 Introduction
Energy policy scholars argue for a prominent federal role in energy policymaking and
investments. Margolis and Kammen (1999) argue that the federal government has
underinvested in renewable energy research and development, limiting the federal
government’s ability to respond to global climate change. Laird and Stefes (2009)
compare renewable energy production in the United States to the more developed
renewable energy system in Denmark. They argue that Denmark’s centralized policies
have helped to support renewable energy development. By comparison, they credit the
underdeveloped renewable energy market in the United States to weak federal policy
support. Finally, Sovacool (2008; 2009) argues that federal comprehensive policy is
necessary to overcome barriers to renewable energy development, including inconsistent
political support, market failure, upfront costs of investments, and misinformation about
the benefits of renewable energy investments.
While energy policy studies discuss issues with decentralized provision and how
the federal government should address this policy issue, they do not directly consider the
centralization-decentralization tradeoff of renewable energy provision. Instead, fiscal
federalism studies provide the theoretical underpinnings of normative arguments
concerning provision of goods, discussing the role of government, the centralizationdecentralization tradeoff, and the purpose of fiscal transfers. This chapter reviews the
literature and then applies lessons from the literature to renewable energy provision in the
U.S.
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3.2 History of Federalism in the United States
The U.S. has a federalist government—governed by both a central government and
subnational governments, but sovereignty among the three levels of government has
varied since the ratification of the U.S. Constitution. Peterson (2012) explains that the
federal government and states had dual sovereignty before the Civil War, where each
level had control over their own territory and military. The end of the Civil War
dramatically changed federalism in the U.S., giving the federal government sovereignty
and military capacity while allowing each level of government to elect political leaders
and have independent taxing and spending authority. Subsequently, the New Deal in the
1930s expanded the federal government’s spending power, but state and local
governments have continued to raise a significant amount of taxes for domestic spending.
Authority over policymaking has also varied over time and by policy. Policies can
be either centralized, giving the federal government primary authority of overseeing the
policy, or decentralized, where primary authority to oversee the policy is delegated to
state or local governments. The United States has embraced a “complicated” process of
both types of policymaking (Oates, 1993). The United States has also experienced an
increase in special districts that govern multiple local jurisdictions to provide public
services, which has also contributed to the complexity of government in the United States
(Oates, 1999).13 This has marked a movement of joint decision-making among different
levels of government and a move towards more intergovernmental decision-making.

13

Many scholars write about the complexity of the U.S. government. Seminal examples include Ostrom,
Tiebout, and Warren (1961) who describe the “polycentric governance” as independent, decision-making
governments that govern within a system (instead of a three-tier hierarchy). Frey and Eichenberger’s
(1999) functional, overlapping and competing jurisdictions (FOCJ) describe special jurisdictions that form
to provide a particular good or service but overlap across competing jurisdictions.

21

Intergovernmental transfers, a prominent fiscal policy tool, have added to the
complexity of intergovernmental decision-making. Intergovernmental transfers primarily
flow from the federal government to state and local governments to fund subnational
policies or projects, creating policymaking interdependence between the separate levels
of government. Figure 3.1 shows total federal outlays for grants to state and local
governments as a percentage of total federal outlays from 1990 to 2018. The average
relative size of fiscal transfers increased over this time period.14 Total outlays to state and
local governments as a percentage of total federal outlays increased from 11 percent in
1990 to 18 percent in 2018. There was a noticeable decline in fiscal transfers as a
percentage of total federal outlays from 2003 to 2009. The increase from 2009 to 2010
corresponds with the implementation of ARRA.
Figure 3.1
Total Federal Outlays for Grants to State and Local Governments as a
Percentage of Total Federal Outlays, 1990 to 2018
Grants as a Percentage of Outlays
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Notes: Data are adjusted for inflation. The amount for 2018 is estimated.
Source: Office of Management and Budget, “Table 12.2” and “Table 1.1”
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It is unclear what led to the increase in fiscal transfers over this time period. Baicker et al. (2011) discuss
the positive relationship between fiscal transfers and the growth of state budgets as federal policies and
legal constraints lead states to spend more on education, health, and public welfare.
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Some scholars attempt to define the optimal federalist structure. Most notably,
Oates (1972; 1999) claims that federalism promotes allocative efficiency by allowing
goods to be provided by the level of government that is most suited to provide them. He
argues that the central government should be responsible for macroeconomic
stabilization, distribution of income, and providing goods that benefit society as a whole.
He also argues that local governments should be responsible for providing goods that
primarily benefit their respective residents. Inman and Rubinfeld (1997a) lay out three
different types of federalism to discuss optimality: economic federalism, cooperative
federalism, and democratic federalism. All three types focus on assigning responsibilities
to the proper levels of government but differ in how to achieve the optimal provision of
goods. Generally, economic federalism emphasizes the importance of economic
efficiency where goods are provided at the most decentralized level of government
capable of internalizing externalities. Cooperative federalism is similar except that it also
considers the willingness of elected officials to unanimously agree to centralized policies.
Democratic federalism is also similar to economic federalism except that it also places
the most value on civil liberty, where the majority of elected officials agree to centralized
policies. Therefore, the optimal structure of government depends on how federalism is
defined, which may vary over time or by policy area.

3.3 Federal Intervention and Centralization
The literature explains the role and responsibilities of the federal government. Samuelson
(1954; 1955) is one of the earliest scholars to demonstrate how the optimal provision of
public goods is different from the optimal provision of private goods, arguing for federal
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provision of public goods. Musgrave (1959) and Oates (1972) argue that the federal
government is responsible for the three roles of budgetary policy: macroeconomic
stabilization, redistribution, and allocation of resources. Musgrave argues that the federal
government achieves macroeconomic stabilization by maintaining a steady currency, and
the federal government redistributes wealth or income across individuals to pursue a
more equitable distribution. Musgrave (1961) argues that the federal government has an
obligation to respond to individuals regardless of state policies to maintain equity but is
also responsible for respecting state policies and improving fiscal performance.
Scholars also explain the advantages of centralization. Oates (1972) explains that
local governments are limited in their ability to regulate the economy, allocate income, or
provide the efficient level of the public good due to the leakages that occur because of the
mobility of residents and businesses. Centralized policies can eliminate the potential for
leakages. Additionally, the central government may be better off providing the good
because of economies of scale (Musgrave, 1961; Oates, 1972). The national government
typically has more access to resources, which is ensured by the federal government’s
ability to run a deficit to meet obligations.
The disadvantages of centralization provide justification for decentralization.
Uniformity in the level of public good provided is the most commonly discussed
disadvantage of centralization. In Oates’ (1972) discussion of impure public goods, he
argues that if the efficient provision of public goods varies by jurisdiction, a uniform
central policy will create a loss in welfare. The extent of the loss depends on the
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magnitude of the differences in the efficient levels of provision across jurisdictions. 15
Oates implies that decision makers should consider the potential welfare losses when
deciding whether an impure public good should be centralized or decentralized.
However, Besley and Coate (2003) show that centralized policies lead to greater surplus
than decentralized policies when spillovers are large, even when local governments are
not identical.
Furthermore, Inman and Rubinfeld (1997b) discuss a disadvantage of having too
much centralization, arguing that heavy local representation in the central government
will increase democratic representation but reduce economic efficiency. Conversely, if
the central government has sole responsibility over policymaking with little local
representation (too little centralization), democratic representation is completely
diminished. Therefore, the optimal level of centralization involves a tradeoff between
democracy and economic efficiency.
More recent literature discusses the disadvantages of centralization by considering
institutional structure and politics. Tommasi and Weinschelbaum (2007) argue that the
central government may be better able to internalize externalities but can create an
“agency problem.” When multiple principals make decisions at the federal level, efforts
cannot be easily monitored, and coordination may be difficult. The common pool
problem is related, occurring because taxpayers pay the same average cost when goods
are centralized. Therefore, the marginal cost to each individual for using the good is
much lower than it would be if that good was provided at the local level, creating an

15

Although, Wrede (2006) takes a political economy approach to argue that uniform policy under
centralization provides a better outcome than centralization without uniformity, because uniformity
reduces the opportunities for exploitation by special interests.
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incentive for rent-seeking (e.g. Weingast, 2009). Special interests may seek to maximize
their own output when costs are shared by everyone (e.g. Persson and Tabellini, 1994;
Weingast et al., 1981; Knight, 2004).

3.4 The Purpose of Decentralization
Musgrave’s (1959) third objective of budgetary policy, allocation of resources, is the
economic justification for federalism (Oates, 1991). Oates explains that the federal
government’s role is to oversee allocation of resources and provide the overall efficient
level of the public good, and local governments are responsible for allocating it. Local
governments can offer different levels of the public good, which increases efficiency by
allowing individuals to sort into jurisdictions according to their preferences (Tiebout,
1956; Oates, 1972). Furthermore, efficiency gains through decentralization are increased
by mobility of individuals but still exist without it (Oates, 1999). Decisions at the central
level are removed from citizens, and decision-makers face both informational and
political constraints that keep them from responding to individual jurisdictions (Oates,
1999). On the other hand, local governments know more about local preferences than the
national government (e.g. Hayek, 1945; Oates, 1972; Brueckner, 1999). Oates’ infamous
Decentralization Theorem states,
“it will always be more efficient (or at least as efficient) for local
governments to provide the Pareto-efficient levels of output for their
respective jurisdictions than for the central government to provide any
specified and uniform level of output across all jurisdictions” (Oates,
1972, p. 35).
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Enhanced accountability is another benefit of decentralization. Jurisdictions are
better able to internalize the costs of their spending decisions when they are responsible
for providing the public good (Oates, 1972). As previously mentioned, taxpayers pay the
average cost of a centrally provided public goods, leading local taxpayers to have less
information about costs of providing the public good in their own jurisdiction. With local
provision, the costs of public goods are more closely tied to local taxes, giving taxpayers
more information about the true costs of public provision. Furthermore, Weingast (2009)
argues that localizing decisions increases accountability to make democracy more stable
as constituents are better able to monitor spending decisions.
The potential for innovation is a benefit of decentralization is less emphasized in
the literature.16 Decentralization provides the opportunity for local governments to make
their own spending decisions and create innovative policy solutions to address policy
issues (Oates, 1972). The greatest potential for innovation is when local governments are
relatively heterogeneous and can use different policy approaches (Strumpf, 2002).
Finally, some scholars argue that efficiency gains from decentralization might lead to
economic development (Oates, 1999). However, studies looking at the relationship find
mixed results.17

16

The potential for innovation as a result of decentralization has been acknowledged in other literature.
For example, Galle and Leahy (2009) point out that numerous scholars discuss the potential for
laboratories of innovation at the local level and note that this argument has been discussed in court cases
starting as early as the 1930s. Furthermore, diffusion studies discuss how state and local governments
overcome the collective action problem to adopt innovative climate change policies (e.g. Lutsy and
Sperling, 2008; Rabe, 2008; 2011; Feiock et al., 2009; Carly, 2011).
17
Xie et al. (1999) look at the United States and suggest that a relationship between decentralization and
economic development might exist but add that further decentralization will not further increase
economic growth. Studies on other countries have conflicting conclusions. Davoodi and Zou (1998) find no
relationship; Iimi (2005) finds a positive relationship; and Bahl and Linn (1992) argue reverse causality,
where economic development leads to decentralization, because decentralization becomes more
beneficial as countries become more developed.
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The literature also puts forth several disadvantages of decentralization.
Externalities are the most commonly discussed. Local jurisdictions have no incentive to
internalize externalities when choosing a level of public good. Ogawa and Wildasin
(2009) argue that when externalities affect local jurisdictions disproportionality, the
federal government is justified in providing the public good. Second, local governments
often have scarce resources when compared to the federal government, because they are
restricted by a balanced-budget requirement. This can become an issue for local
governments that do not have sufficient resources for capital and research investments.
A second potential disadvantage of decentralization is soft budget constraints.
They result from bailouts by the federal government, meaning that the federal
government assumes control of financing local projects up to a point that maintains the
level of goods or services demanded by “external constituents” (Wildasin, 2004). This
phenomenon occurs when the federal government subsidizes spending of local
governments who provide local goods beyond the levels attainable with their respective
budgets. Wildasin (2004) argues that residents in one jurisdiction may benefit from a
bailout if services benefit nonresidents, because it reduces the costs of the services that
residents must pay for the services provided to the nonresidents. Therefore, soft budget
constraints incentivize local governments to exceed their budgets (e.g., Inman, 2003;
Oates, 2005). Weingast (2009) argues that local governments must face hard budget
constraints for the federalist society to work. However, benefit taxation—where
jurisdictions tax goods and services that are provided directly to the residents—has been
proposed as a solution to soft budget constraints, because it allows residents to
communicate preferences to local decision makers (Oates, 1999).
28

Other potential disadvantages of decentralization relate to taxation. First, is the
“tax assignment problem,” which refers to decisions about who should tax and how much
should be taxed (McClure, 1999; 2001). McClure (2001) argues that the inability for
local governments to control these decisions and to effectively implement local taxes can
lead to vertical fiscal imbalance, an insufficient amount of tax revenue to provide local
public goods. Local taxation issues can relate to the ability of local governments to tax
economic activity and capture revenue from mobile capital and residents. For example,
residents can shop across borders to escape taxes; capital owners may live out of state; or
residents might commute across borders for employment. As methods to ease the tax
assignment problem, he suggests that neighboring jurisdictions coordinate tax rates, tax
policies, and which items are subject to taxation.
A final potential disadvantage is “race to the bottom.” Although not clearly
defined in the fiscal federalism literature, it generally refers to jurisdictions offering suboptimal taxes or restrictions on capital to compete for capital investments. The
competition creates allocative deficiencies, leading to a suboptimal level of the public
good (Oates, 1999). Current empirical studies on labor markets and welfare reform find
evidence of race to the bottom (e.g. Olney, 2013; Davies and Vadlamannati, 2013;
Dahlberg and Edmark, 2008; Brueckner, 2000). In contrast, empirical studies on
environmental policies do not find race to the bottom, as states and local governments do
not relax environmental regulations in response to economic pressures (e.g. Potoski,
2001; Konisky, 2007).18 Conversely, mobile capital can create revenue problems for local
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Alternatively, Oates (1999) claims that we need to mainly be concerned with the size of the distortions
caused by competition instead of debating whether they exist.
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jurisdictions, because they can move out of taxing jurisdiction. Thus, the marginal cost of
raising revenue may be larger than anticipated, although these issues can be mitigated
with careful tax design. Bird (1986) argues that local governments should coordinate
local taxes to prevent unintended distortions in economic activity. Benefit taxation has
also been proposed as a solution to both race to the bottom and the tax assignment
problem (e.g. Oates, 1996, 1999; Schwab and Oates, 2010 1991; McClure, 1999).
Political economy literature incorporates rent-seeking and the effects of political
institutions into the centralization-decentralization tradeoff. Besley and Coate (1997;
2003) and others use the citizen-candidate model to provide additional insight as to why
the tradeoff between centralization and decentralization is not as simple as considering
the implications for economic efficiency. 19 These models argue that policymakers
represent citizens from their own districts who have preferences for favoring their
respective jurisdictions in centralized decision making. Therefore, policymakers might be
incentivized to misallocate public goods, depending on characteristics of the legislature.
Epple and Nechyba (2004), who review the literature on decentralization, point out that
politics adds a complex dimension to evaluating the effects of decentralized policy. One
lesson is that political decisions are fundamentally different under decentralization
because of local competition. Another lesson is that the effects of decentralization may be
situational. As an example, Epple and Nechyba discuss how the economic effects of
education are affected by the effects of education in neighboring jurisdictions. They also
point out the rise of private options may also change the expected outcome of
decentralized education. The implication is that politics, interjurisdictional competition,

19

See Osborne and Slivinski (1996) for the original use of the citizen-candidate model.
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and interjurisdictional collaboration all have the potential to affect the outcome of
decentralized policymaking.
3.5 The Purpose of Intergovernmental Transfers
Intergovernmental transfers are a fiscal policy tool available to the central
government to support decentralized policymaking. Oates (1972; 1991; 1999) discusses
three purposes of grants. One purpose is to correct for positive externalities. Oates (1972)
discusses using Pigovian grants to correct positive externalities. 20 Pigovian grants are
designed to provide an amount to local governments equal to the marginal external
benefit so that local governments are encouraged to provide the socially optimal level of
the public good. Oates claims that Pigovian grants should be used in instances where the
externalities are generated by several jurisdictions.21 He describes a matching grant,
which provides a fiscal transfer from the federal government to a local jurisdiction with a
requirement that the local jurisdiction match a certain percentage of each dollar received.
The grant changes the marginal price of an activity, causing governments to internalize
the social marginal cost and produce the optimal outcome. It has a price effect in addition
to an income effect. Since matching grants change the marginal price of output, Oates
says that it should be used to correct distortions in the provision of public goods.
Federal grants are also used to ensure equity in fiscal capacities across
jurisdictions (Oates 1972; 1991; 1999). This is accomplished by providing lump sum
grants to poorer jurisdictions using income from richer jurisdictions so that all

20

See Pigou (1920).
In the cases where only a few jurisdictions are generating an externality, he claims that the federal
government should intervene to oversee a negotiation between the party generating the externality and
those affected by it.
21
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jurisdictions are enabled to provide some level of public goods to their residents.
However, he points out issues with using lump sum grants to address inequalities at the
jurisdictional level. There will likely be a small population of rich individuals living in
poor jurisdictions (and a small population of poor individuals living in rich jurisdictions)
who will unfairly benefit (or be harmed). Therefore, Oates argues for redistribution
across individuals instead of jurisdictions to address inequalities or for equalization at the
regional level to reduce mobility if redistribution across individuals is not possible. Oates
(1991) adds that there may also be an economic rationale for using lump sum grants,
offering education as an example. We value the economic benefits of educated workers in
our mobile society in addition to providing equal access to education. Finally, lump sum
grants can be used to enhance efficiency by supporting different levels of the public good
across jurisdictions in cases where centralization reduces heterogeneity (Schwab and
Oates, 1990).
Oates (1972) distinguishes lump sum grants from matching grants by discussing
the economic effects of each type of grant. Lump sum grants are unconditional, meaning
that jurisdictions are free to allocate funds between the public good and private goods. In
other words, lump sum grants do not distort the relative prices of each type of good.
Instead, they have only an income effect, whereas matching grants have both an income
and a price effect.22 This is why Oates (1972) argues that lump sum grants should not be
used as a corrective mechanism for public good provision.23 However, in response to
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Also see Bradford and Oates (1971).
Oates (1972) notes that the one exception to when a lump sum grant will not lead to the optimal
outcome is the case where the local government spent nothing on the public good prior to receiving the
grant.
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Gramlich (1977) who suggests that lump sum grants change the price of local provision
of public goods (thus changing the quantity demanded), Oates (1991) finds that lump sum
grants have a price effect. Oates’ model shows that the effect of a lump sum transfer will
depend on the elasticities of demand, meaning that the change in quantity demanded
could either increase, decrease, or stay the same.
The third role of federal grants is to improve the efficiency of the tax system
(Oates 1991; 1999). This is accomplished by replacing local taxes with federal taxes and
then redistributing the money back to local governments to reduce inefficiencies
associated with local tax revenue. Wildasin (1991) explains how inefficiencies arise with
local taxation by considering tax redistribution across jurisdictions that share a common
labor market. Since redistribution takes from the richer residents and gives to the poorer
residents, he argues that jurisdictions with higher levels of redistribution will attract
poorer residents but deter taxpayers. Therefore, redistribution among local jurisdictions
can cause distortions in the labor market and wealth across localities. In contrast, a
centralized tax is uniform, providing no incentive for individuals to relocate across
localities (Oates, 1999). Oates argues that the federal government will presumably
redistribute using lump sum transfers to equalize disparities across localities to account
for the inequalities of imposing a uniform tax.
Scholars who discuss the effectiveness of fiscal transfers in correcting
inefficiencies and inequities in decentralized policymaking rely on strong assumptions
about local governments. Oates (1972) acknowledges that fiscal transfers can achieve the
optimal outcome in public good provision only if local governments act on behalf of their
residents. Most first generation fiscal federalism models assume that the government will
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act to maximize the welfare of individuals. However, the political process also affects
public good provision (Bradford and Oates, 1971a). Another assumption is that local
governments will willingly accept fiscal transfers to improve social welfare, which may
not be accurate. Wildasin (2004) points out that local governments might value local
provision and prefer to oversee all public good provision as opposed to accepting federal
fiscal transfers to achieve the socially optimal output. 24 Finally, Wildasin also argues that
spillovers can result from misallocated responsibilities across the separate levels of
government. In this case, institutional restructuring may be more appropriate than using
fiscal transfers (Buchanan, 1950; 1952; Buchanan and Tullock, 1962; Buchanan and
Wagner, 1970).
The literature also makes assumptions about the complexity of designing a grant
program. Most theoretical literature assumes that externalities can be measured. In some
cases, we can infer the size of the externality. For example, we may consider how
location affects housing prices by measuring an individual’s willingness to pay to be
either near or far away from certain types of externalities. However, this is difficult to do
on a large scale, because there is not always a simple way to measure external costs and
benefits, especially when they are produced by several jurisdictions. Additionally, the
literature does not address the difficulty of justifying the use of a grant program. Bird et
al. (2002) calls for us to consider cost and allocative efficiency and equity when choosing
the appropriate grant. However, considering costs, allocative efficiency, and equity can
be inherently difficult. For example, the central government explain why local provision
is suboptimal and whether the suboptimal provision relates to allocative efficiency or
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Wildasin refers to cases in which local governments can provide the good relatively efficiently.
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equity. These complexities might make it difficult for the central government to decide
on matching rates for matching grants and the amount to be transferred to individual
governments in the case of lump sum grants.
There has also been an ongoing debate in the literature regarding the effectiveness
of fiscal transfers, which has led scholarships to evaluate the existence of the “flypaper
effect” as described by Arthur Okun. The flypaper effects results when intergovernmental
transfers lead a jurisdiction to spend more on the public good than they would have if
there were to raise their own income, increasing local provision of the public good.
Several empirical estimates find at least some evidence of the flypaper effect (e.g.,
Inman, 1971, Weicher, 1972; Gramlich et al., 1973; Bowman ,1974; Feldstein, 1975;
Case et al., 1993; Olmsted et al., 1993; Brennan and Pincus, 1996; Rodden, 2003). On
the other hand, few studies find little to no evidence of the flypaper effect (e.g., Zampelli,
1986; Megdal, 1987; Becker, 1996).
Scholars offer different theories to explain the flypaper effect. Hamilton (1983)
differentiates between transfer income and own income to argue that the two have
different effects on demand. In a subsequent article, he attributes the cause to the
marginal deadweight loss due to taxation (Hamilton 1986). Loss aversion and fungibility
are two interrelated concepts also used to explain the flypaper effect (Hines and Thaler,
1995; Kahneman et al., 1991; Thaler, 1990). Loss aversion refers to the concept that
citizens are more opposed to a reduction in welfare than an increase in welfare. In other
words, citizens are more accepting of a grant used to increase in public spending than a
reduction in spending by substituting funds. Fungibility refers to the substitutability of
funds. Completely fungibility occurs when a local government substitutes own public
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spending in an amount equal to a federal grant award. These scholars argue that grant
money and tax revenue are not completely fungible since they are different types of
money.
Some scholars offer fiscal illusion as another explanation for the flypaper effect
(e.g., Courant et al., 1978; Oates, 1979; Filimon et al., 1982; Winer, 1983; Turnbull,
1992; 1998). Generally, fiscal illusion refers to the idea that federal transfers change the
perceived cost of local output. Federal transfers to local governments increase the amount
of information asymmetry between local governments and residents, because they make
it difficult for residents to understand the true marginal cost of producing the local good.
Individuals vote for a level of public provision based on their average tax price instead of
the true marginal cost of the good, leading to a level of provision greater than the desired
level with full information (Courant et al.; Oates). Turnbull offers a different explanation
of fiscal illusion, claiming that voters are aware of the true marginal price but have
incomplete information about expenditures or services they receive (Turnbull, 1992;
1998). Winer argues that voters have the perception that other jurisdictions pay for some
of the local output when grants are used. Fiscal illusion occurs with both the matching
grant and the lump sum grant, but Bradford and Oates (1991) find that in most cases the
matching grant induces more spending on the public good than a lump sum grant,
because the matching grant has a price effect. 25
More recent literature points to endogeneity to explain the flypaper effect. One
argument is that grants are awarded to recipients who have a high demand for the public
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Bradford and Oates illustrate an exception to this finding, showing that if decisions are made by voters
who demand less public goods than the level provided by the median voter under a matching grant, those
voters will vote for a level of provision provided by a lump sum grant.
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good, implying that grant recipients would have invested in the good even without the
grant. After correcting for endogeneity, scholars find that grants have a smaller to no
effect on the level of public good produced (e.g. Knight, 2000; Gordon, 2004). Although
some studies find existence of the flypaper effect after controlling for endogeneity (e.g.
Singhal, 2008; Dahlby, 2008). Lastly, Inman (2008) argues that politics is the best
explanation for the flypaper effect as institutions create incentives for elected officials to
spend differently with grant income.
A final explanation for the flypaper effect, crowding out, conjectures that public
spending crowds out private spending, increasing the size of the public sector. 26 Most
literature looks at the effects of intergovernmental transfers on voluntary contributions.
Early theoretical work suggests that a federal grant to an organization completely offsets
voluntary contributions to that organization (e.g. Warr, 1982; Roberts, 1984; 1987;
Bergstrom et al., 1986). Empirical evidence on the effects of crowding out private
donations finds incomplete to complete crowding out (e.g. Andreoni, 1993; Payne, 1998;
Eckel et al., 2005; Heutel, 2014). However, following a subset of literature looking at the
effects of fundraising and crowding out, Andreoni and Payne (2003; 2011) find that
crowding out is primarily caused by reduced efforts to fundraise after receiving a grant.
Literature on crowding out also considers effects of intergovernmental transfers on state
spending. Bradford and Oates (1971a; 1971b) suggest that federal transfers will
completely crowd out state spending. Knight (2002) controls for the endogeneity of local
demand for intergovernmental transfers and finds that crowding out is statistically
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significant. He argues that crowding out can help us to understand the flypaper effect,
because these two effects work in the same way.
Most early scholars ignore the effects of politics and institutions on the
distribution of fiscal transfers. The “second generation fiscal federalism” focuses on how
incentives created by the institutional structure affect fiscal transfers (Qian and Weingast,
1997). Whereas the early fiscal federalism literature assumes that decision makers act on
behalf of all the constituents, the second generation literature incorporates political
behavior and information asymmetry (Oates, 2005). Qian and Weingast compare the
government to firms to suggest the structure of government does not require that decision
makers act on behalf of citizens. Weingast (2009) argues that the institutional structure
incentivizes political officials to behave in ways that do not necessarily lead to social
welfare maximization. Following Downs (1957) and others, he assumes that politicians
are self-interested. The empirical literature supports this argument, finding that special
interests and politics play a role in affecting fiscal transfers (e.g. Becker, 1983;
Grossman, 1994; Inman, 1987; Knight, 2002; Bordignon et al., 2008; Inman, 2008).
Despite concerns with the implementation of fiscal transfers, scholars argue that
they can be efficient and offer advice on how to minimize unintended incentives. First,
local governments should generate their own revenue to ensure responsible decisionmaking at the local level (e.g., Bird, 1986; Oates, 1993; 1999; 2005). Local governments
can become responsive to higher levels of government when they rely heavily on grant
revenue. This can also lead local governments to have misinformation about the true cost
of raising funds. Bird et al. (2002) discuss increasing accountability through benefit
taxation at the local level, which also corrects other issues with decentralization as
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discussed previously. They argue that local autonomy must be preserved to prevent the
federal government from using fiscal transfers to control local decisions.
The second generation fiscal federalism literature further discusses how local
revenue generation is important for local democracy, building on the first generation
literature. Weingast (2009) discusses criteria for effective federalism. Like first
generation scholars, he argues that local governments should raise their own revenue and
face hard budget constraints, arguing that local governments become more responsive to
their constituents and less corrupt as they finance more expenditures with locallygenerated revenue. Local revenue generation conveys more information to residents
about how much they pay for local services. He adds that the federal government should
use grants and broad-based taxes to encourage local economic development.

3.6 Lessons for Renewable Energy Provision
Determining whether to centralize or decentralize policy provision involves consideration
of the centralization-decentralization tradeoff and the role of fiscal transfers. Scholars
outline a clear role for the federal government and advantages of decentralization.
However, there are decisions to be made about how the subunits will govern together and
what responsibilities will be assigned to each level of government (Inman and Rubinfeld,
1997a). Weingast’s (2009) conditions for “market-preserving federalism” calls us to
think about how to structure institutions so that local governments exist within a
hierarchy and maintain some autonomy. Additionally, fiscal transfers exist to correct
inefficiencies with local provision of the public good, but there is also complexity in
using fiscal transfers given uncertainty, politics, and institutional structure.
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We can use this framework to think about the role of government in renewable
energy provision. The literature provides theoretical guidelines for how to assign
responsibility for public good provision. Among other things, the role of the federal
government is to provide goods with large spillovers, while responding to both states and
individuals. The federal government has a substantial role in making regulatory decisions
for and financing goods with large spillovers, such as environmental protection,
education, healthcare, and food production, for example. Federal intervention can also be
justified on grounds of economies of scale in acquiring the appropriate knowledge and
physical and human capital needed to provide these goods. The same justifications could
be used to argue for some centralized component of renewable energy, because it has
large, positive spillovers and requires expensive investments in human capital and
infrastructure for widespread development.
Current decentralized provision in the United States also indicates what type of
provision is appropriate for renewable energy from a normative perspective. Scholars
argue that decentralized provision can lead to race to the bottom or the tax assignment
problem. Even though there is not clear evidence of race to the bottom, most studies
looking at decentralized policymaking have mixed conclusions regarding effectiveness of
subnational renewable energy policies (e.g. Carley, 2009; Menz and Vachon, 2006;
Delmas and Montes-Sanchos, 2011). Concerning the tax assignment problem, Menanteau
et al. (2003) argue that imposing an environmental tax is the most expeditiously method
of encouraging renewable energy development, although they do not provide suggestions
on how to design or implement an environmental tax. It is reasonable to think that an
environmental tax could be implemented only at the central level given the difficulties of
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designing and implementing a local tax as outlined by McClure (2001). Local benefit
taxation as suggested in the literature does not seem like a viable option, giving the
difficulties of measuring preferences and benefits of renewable energy production, such
as cleaner air, water, and climate mitigation.
The advantages of decentralized renewable energy are observed but perhaps not
sufficient to justify decentralization. We learn that decentralization allows local
governments to cater to constituents’ preferences. State and local governments have
adopted heterogeneous renewable energy policies. While these policies may have been
motivated by constituents’ preferences, second generation fiscal federalism literature
teaches us that policymakers do not always respond to constituents. The public has shown
support for renewable energy since the 1970s (Laird and Stefes, 2009; Stoutenborough et
al., 2014). Yet the market continues to be relatively underdeveloped. Finally,
decentralization allows for policy innovation, which we observe with current subnational
policies adopted since the 1970s. Since the renewable energy market is still
underdeveloped in the United States, it is reasonable to consider if there will be
additional innovations in years to come to further justify decentralization.
We can also apply the lessons from the literature to understand federal grants to
state and local governments for decentralized renewable energy in the United States.
Most energy grants are designed as Pigouvian grants. At the most basic level, the
literature contends that Pigouvian grants can help to correct externalities associated with
decentralized provision. In practice, Pigouvian grants are difficult to implement for
renewable energy, because externalities from renewable energy production are difficult to
measure. This is further complicated by the fact that different forms of energy technology
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produce different levels of renewable energy. Even if grants could be designed to
increase the optimal level of renewable energy, grant programs do not necessarily address
informational asymmetry regarding the true costs of renewable energy development. For
example, utility companies can have complicated pricing structures and difficult or
nonexistent interconnection standards.
One could also argue for equalization grants on the premise that localities are not
equally capable of investing in research or infrastructure for renewable energy.
Equalization grants used without centralized policy could be difficult in practice as they
would require extensive oversight from the federal government. Renewable energy
resources and available infrastructure vary across jurisdictions. For example, some
jurisdictions in the West are best able to develop geothermal energy whereas jurisdictions
in the Midwest are more suited for wind or biomass energy. As a result, these
jurisdictions face different costs for investments in infrastructure, information, and
human capital, possibly making program implementation difficult.
Lessons from the fiscal federalism literature suggest that a centralized renewable
energy policy might be more efficient than decentralized renewable energy provision.
Centralized policies can also be implemented without preempting current state and local
policies. This dissertation explores why federal policymakers choose to decentralize
renewable energy by way of fiscal transfers. Chapter Four puts forth a theoretical model
to explain the circumstances under which federal policymakers are incentivized to
support funding for renewable energy grants to subnational governments.
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CHAPTER FOUR: A CONCEPTUAL PERSPECTIVE ON CHOOSING
DECENTRALIZED CLEAN ENERGY IN THE UNITED STATES
4.1 Introduction
Federal policymakers have at least some discretion over decisions regarding the
centralization or decentralization of public goods. These policymakers can also distribute
fiscal transfers to federal agencies to provide a centralized good, provide grants to
subnational governments to support decentralized provision of goods, or some
combination of both. In his review of the literature, Oates (2005) explains how the choice
between centralization and decentralization involves more than a consideration of which
level of government can provide a public good more efficiently. As discussed in the
previous chapter, he points out that imperfect information and institutional incentives
affect decision-making. This chapter builds on previous studies to consider the
centralization-decentralization tradeoff of energy policy from this perspective.
U.S. Policymakers’ choices for renewable energy provision can be generalized
into two basic types of decisions. First, the majority of policymakers have decided not to
support centralized provision of renewable energy policy and development, which has
been evident in failed attempts to pass centralized clean energy policies. This decision
has been discussed in the literature, mainly by studies looking at subnational policy
efforts in response to a lack of federal response to renewable energy (e.g. BromleyTrujillo et al., 2016; Aslani and Wong, 2014; Carley, 2011; Delmas and Montes-Sancho,
2011; Feiock et al., 2009; 2010, Rabe, 2008). Second, policymakers choose to provide
annual appropriations for grant programs to support subnational renewable energy
provision. The majority of grant programs are implemented by the U.S. Department of
Energy, which awards money to state and local governments to partially cover costs of
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clean energy investments. The decision to utilize grants for renewable energy has
received less attention in the literature.
The broader political and institutional context in which these decisions are made
can help us to understand the motivation for these two decisions. The public has shown
support for renewable energy since the 1970s, but the federal government has not
provided consistent federal policy support and funding for renewable energy
development (Laird and Stefes, 2009; Stoutenborough et al., 2014). Scholars speculate as
to why efforts to pass centralized renewable energy policies have failed. Bang (2010)
argues that policymakers value clean energy as a solution to energy independence and
climate change, but policymakers cannot agree on a policy approach to implement
renewable energy at the federal level. Wüstenhagen et al. (2007) explains that
policymakers might lack support from major stakeholders; fail to implement effective
policies; and not understand public preferences for centralized energy implementation
and location. Bang also argues that fossil fuels dominate the energy market in the United
States, providing fossil fuel lobbying groups the political power to discourage federal
action on renewable energy development and keep the status quo in energy policy.
However, these studies have not empirically evaluated the decision-making relationship,
which is the focus of this dissertation.
Furthermore, renewable energy is subject to the political discourse of climate
change policy, because clean energy is regarded as a solution to help mitigate climate
change (Brown, 2001; Menanteau et al., 2003; Longo et al., 2008; Roe et al., 2001;
Wiser, 2007; Goett et al., 2000; Batley et al., 2001; Beck and Martinot, 2004). Climate
change policy is salient and controversial in the United States. Despite hundreds of
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congressional hearings on climate change, the federal government has failed to pass a
comprehensive climate policy at the national level (Rabe, 2007). Instead, public
preferences for climate change have become polarized across partisan or ideological lines
(Egan and Mullin, 2017; Dunlap et al., 2016; Stoutenborough et al., 2014; Dunlap and
McCright, 2008; Fiorina and Abrams, 2008; Krosnick and Holbrook, 2000). In general,
the public is divided on whether they consider climate change to be a policy issue and
whether the federal government should adopt policies to address climate change. Political
leaders continue to debate if climate policies should be adopted and who should be
responsible for addressing this policy issue. Most of the difficulty for policymakers has
been balancing both economic and political concerns while responding to both industry
and environmentalists (Hahn, 1990; Kolstad and Toman, 2005).
Controversy over energy policy exists primarily at the national level. Local
renewable energy policies are potentially less controversial as they allow for innovation
and costs savings (Feiock et al., 2009; 2010). Policies in individual jurisdictions can be
tailored to suit local heterogeneous preferences to achieve clean energy and energy
efficiency goals. Feiock et al. (2010) explains that energy development can sometimes be
implemented using existing technologies in individual jurisdictions. For example, energy
systems are often tied directly to governmental operations or buildings. Additionally,
decentralized local energy policies allow local government to utilize existing energy
resources. Feiock et al. also argue that clean energy technologies can result in energy
costs savings for local governments by increasing energy efficiency.
The energy policy literature explains why the federal government has failed to
pass a centralized renewable energy policy. This chapter takes a different perspective to
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explain why legislators appear to choose decentralized renewable energy policy. I do so
by exploring a policymaker’s decision to federally fund centralized or decentralized
renewable energy. Borrowing assumptions from legislative bargaining models, I put forth
a conceptual model of legislative decision-making. This chapter contributes to existing
work in two ways. First, I offer a perspective on the centralization-decentralization
different from current legislative bargaining studies. Whereas other scholars conduct a
comparison of a legislator’s utility under centralization and decentralization, this model
considers a legislator’s decision to choose funding to support centralization or
decentralization. Second, I discuss the political price of decision-making, which is related
to proposing centralized or decentralized good provision for a specific good. I include
political price directly into the constraint on a legislator’s utility function to show how
political price affects the optimal outcome.
The chapter proceeds as follows. I discuss studies on legislative behavior in the
following section to explain how incentives and institutional structure affect public good
provision. In the third section, I use the literature to inform a theoretical model to explain
a legislator’s decision to either centralize or decentralize a policy by way of utility
maximization subject to institutional constraints. I do so by showing the relationship
between political price and the type of a proposed good provision. I argue that legislators
responsible for clean energy policy are incentivized to provide funding for decentralized
renewable energy policy instead of centralized renewable energy policy despite large
spillovers of clean energy. I conclude the chapter by discussing how this theoretical
model explains decentralized clean energy policy in the United States and provide
motivation for subsequent empirical chapters.
46

4.2 Legislative Behavior
The economic literature in the preceding chapter discusses normative arguments for
choosing centralization or decentralization. However, studies on legislative behavior
explain how self-interest can affect a legislator’s decision to choose the optimal amount
of public good provision. Some studies explain overprovision by focusing on a
legislator’s role in Congress. Most notably, Niskanen discusses a legislator’s behavior
while serving on a subcommittee to explain how the public good can be overprovided
(Niskanen, 1971; 1975; 1991; 2008). Legislators oversee bureaus through their
appointments on their legislative subcommittees, and subcommittee appointments are
often tied to interests of their constituents. Niskanan argues that legislators typically
demand a level of output from the bureau that is higher than the demand of the median
voter. I borrow to from Niskanen by considering good provision within the context of
self-interested legislators who serve on legislative subcommittees tied to their own
interest. However, I use this assumption to explain under provision of goods.
The second generation fiscal federalism literature relates the work of Niskanan to
public good provision. The literature incorporates the political process, political behavior
and asymmetry of information to understand the behavior of legislators (e.g. Oates, 2005;
Weingast, 2009). Oates explains that institutions of imperfect information encourage
participants to seek their own objectives instead of a common good. Therefore, the
decision to centralize or decentralize is influenced by legislators’ own objectives subject
to constraints on their behavior. For example, Weingast et al. (1981) assume legislators
choose a level of spending for their constituents independently of decisions made by
other legislators. They argue that this is inefficient and leads to overprovision of the
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public good. Furthermore, the distribution of fiscal transfers—which are intended to aid
decentralized provision—might be affected be self-interest. For example, scholars argue
that politicians distribute grants to local governments in effort to maximize votes from
their constituents (e.g. Grossman, 1994; Inman, 1987; Rodden, 2003; Gamkhar and Ali,
2008).

4.3 Legislative Bargaining Models
Scholars also model the legislative bargaining process to show how strategic behavior
affects the provision of goods.27 Some studies on legislative bargaining take a political
economy approach and find that politics affect the level of spending on goods. For
example, Baron and Ferejohn (1989) assume that the legislature is non-cooperative,
leading to an overprovision of goods in jurisdictions with the highest levels of political
power, underprovided in other jurisdictions, and overprovided overall. Knight finds that
legislators with proposal power have the greatest amount of overspending (Knight, 2008;
2005). Rather than focusing on overall level, Leblanc et al. (2000) argues the existence of
a systematic underinvestment in public goods caused by majority-rule governance. They
argue that current majorities make decisions based on current consumption and
underinvest in future consumption.
Legislative bargaining models also show how centralized spending relates to tax
burden. Generally, these models argue that legislators will support centralized spending
on a project if the benefits going to his or her constituents exceed the share of taxes those
constituents will pay. For example, Knight (2004) finds that the probability of a legislator
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Legislative bargaining is a concept developed by Baron and Ferejohn (1989), which assumes that
legislators strategize to reach a policy outcome.
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supporting funding for a project increases as his or her district’s share of the tax burden
decreases. Lorz and Willman (2005) argue that representatives intentionally choose a
suboptimal public spending to reduce their region’s share of the tax burden. Although
scholars also suggest that the level of spending depends on a legislator’s preferences for
spending on pork projects and spending on the common good (Volden and Wiseman,
2007; Christiansen, 2013).
Scholars also use legislative bargaining models to directly evaluate the
centralization-decentralization tradeoff. Models in the literature typically build from the
citizen-candidate model, where legislators are elected by voters who share the same
preferences (e.g. Osborne and Slivinski, 1996; Lockwood, 2002; Besley and Coate, 1997;
Besley and Coate, 2003). These studies reevaluate Oates’ (1972) Decentralization
Theorem to show the circumstances under which centralized output does not necessarily
result in uniform provision and can lead to inefficiencies even with large spillovers.
These models assume that legislative institutions create incentives to misallocate goods
under centralization (Oates, 2005). Given these institutional assumptions, the choice
between centralization and decentralization is a tradeoff between decentralized output
that cannot internalize externalities and centralization output with misallocations.
Lockwood (2002) compares the relative efficiency of centralization and
decentralization within the framework of legislative rules. He finds some support for
Oates’ decentralization theorem, arguing that uniform provision is relatively efficient
with large, positive externalities, and decentralization is more efficient when externalities
are small or localities are heterogeneous. Lockwood’s contribution is in his argument that
centralization does not necessarily lead to greater surplus with increasing externalities
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and more homogeneous jurisdictions. Instead, a project’s non-monotonic costs will also
determine the optimal choice between centralization and decentralization. He discusses
the case of logrolling where legislators vote for spending on projects that benefit their
respective jurisdictions. To the extent that regional projects’ positive externalities are
increasingly smaller than the number of region-specific projects funded, centralization
can become increasingly inefficient. Therefore, decentralization may become more
efficient in cases where legislators are likely to vote for projects that provide increasingly
disproportionate regional benefits.
Besley and Coate (2003) model the political process discussed in Inman and
Rubinfeld (1997a; 1997b), who argue that politics is involved in the process of allocating
funds. Besley and Coate argue that legislators’ respective districts can receive
disproportionate benefits from public spending under a centralized system funded by
general taxation. They contend that the cooperativeness of the legislature determines the
size of the spillovers needed for centralization to be the optimal output. They illustrate by
comparing centralized provision to decentralized provision. In a decentralized system, the
surplus-maximizing output is determined by each jurisdiction’s median voter, who elects
representatives who share the same preferences.
Besley and Coate (2003) argue that the efficiencies of output depend on the
cooperativeness of the legislature under centralization. If the legislature is cooperative,
legislators will bargain to maximize their joint utility. Under this scenario, legislators
bargain for their respective constituents, not the median voter across all districts.
Therefore, legislators overprovide the good when maximizing their joint utilities.
Therefore, there is a certain threshold of spillovers, k*, for choosing between
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centralization and decentralization, where centralization is preferred when spillovers are
above k*. Besley and Coate add that the policy outcome is random under a centralized
system with a non-cooperative legislature, where a winning coalition makes decisions,
leading to uncertainty and misallocation of resources. In the case of a non-cooperative
legislature, the threshold for k* is higher.
Furthermore, Lockwood (2005) includes benefits and costs of centralized and
decentralized projects in the legislator’s utility function and shows that legislators can act
like they are maximizing joint utilities in a centralized system if they are able to make
side payments to one another. He argues that Besley and Coate’s (2003) model holds if
side payments are made through personal transfers. However, he argues that Besley and
Coate’s model does not apply if those side payments are made through differentiated
taxes. If this is the case, there is an incentive for legislators to bargain and centralization
is efficient. Following the second generation fiscal federalism literature, Lockwood
(2008) argues that institutions and organized interests affect preferences. He uses this
framework to evaluate how strategic delegation affects the centralization-decentralization
tradeoff. He finds that strategic delegation does not necessarily invalidate Oates’ classic
theory of the tradeoff. Instead, the welfare-maximizing choice can depend on the
preferences of voters. Centralization can be welfare-maximizing with no spillovers and
heterogeneous jurisdictions if the preferences of the majority of voters outweigh the loss
of efficiency. Conversely, decentralization may be preferred when there are large
spillovers and relatively homogeneous jurisdictions.
Legislative bargaining models have been used to explain why normative
economic rules regarding the centralization-decentralization tradeoff do not always
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determine whether a legislator will support centralization or decentralization. Some
legislative bargaining models show rules that determine whether a legislator will vote for
centralized spending on a project. Other studies evaluate a legislator’s utility under
centralization and decentralization separately to show the circumstances under which
decentralization is more efficient given the institutional incentives that affect legislators’
behavior. In the following section, I build on these models to offer a different perspective
on a legislator’s decision-making process. I focus on a legislator’s decision to choose
whether to offer a good at the central level or support decentralized provision. Before a
legislator proposes a distribution and level of spending, he or she must first consider the
likelihood of the proposed centralized or decentralized policy passing the legislature,
which is determined by the political price of each type of proposed policy provision. The
theoretical model suggests that political price will determine whether a legislator choose
to propose centralized or decentralized provision for a good.

4.4 Theoretical Model
Current legislative bargaining models analyze the decision to centralize or decentralize
policy by comparing outcomes under both types of provision by showing which option
maximizes own utility. These models generally explain overprovision of a good.
However, the model I propose looks at the centralization-decentralization tradeoff from a
different perspective to explain under provision of a good. Instead of comparing
outcomes under the two different types of provision while assuming that the centralized
or decentralized policy is exogenously given, I treat a legislator’s choice to either
centralize or decentralize policy as the variable. Therefore, I consider a different stage in
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the decision-making process where a legislator determines which type of policy to
propose. This perspective contributes to the literature by offering an explanation as to
why we sometimes observe decentralized provision for goods that have a normative
economic justification for centralization.
I begin with assumptions from the literature to put forth a conceptual model of
legislative decision-making. I start with legislative bargaining models, which use citizencandidate utility functions. In one of the most basic forms, the utility of legislator i from
jurisdiction j and with preferences α can be described as a quasi-linear function: U i,α = ci
+ αH(gi), where ci is private consumption and gi is a level of the goods provided by the
government (e.g. Persson and Tabellini, 2000). This utility model assumes that legislators
are perfect representatives of their constituents. Other studies extend on this model to
incorporate institutional factors that presumably affect decision making.
Instead, the political economy literature starting with Downs (1957) establishes
that reelection is a primary concern for current legislators. For example, Fenno (1977;
1978) argues that incumbents seek to satisfy their constituents to win reelection. Ferejohn
(1986) argues that legislators behave strategically to get reelected, contingent on their
desire for reelection. Fenno (1973) states that legislators seek reelection and their own
policy objectives. Subsequent studies linked reelection to policy objectives. The seminal
work by Peltzman (1976) argues that reelection is a function of pleasing constituents.
Peltzman’s model considers the regulation of industry to argue that legislators can
increase votes by offering benefits to their constituents. Becker (1976) argues that
Peltzman’s model also applies to federal policies that offer cash transfers. Alesina and
Tabellini (2007; 2008) argue that legislators try to increase the probability of reelection
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by maximizing the utility of their constituents. Although I do not formally define
reelection, I assume that legislators can increase the likelihood of reelection by offering
some benefits to constituents using some level of goods. 28 Therefore, I assume that
legislators have a unique utility function as a legislator, and the legislator utility function
includes reelection. Thus, I propose a simplified model of utility of each legislator i
serving on subcommittee j.
Uij = U(r(gij)i, gij, θi)

(1)

Where utility is a function of ri, the probability of getting reelected, gij, the
publicly provided good by subcommittee j, and θ i, a legislator’s preference parameter.
The good, gij, enters the utility function separately and as a function of r i since positive
values of gij can increase utility independently and increase the probability of getting
reelected by benefiting legislator i’s constituents.
For simplicity, I focus only on a legislator’s role as a subcommittee member since
legislators allocate their time making decisions based on subcommittee assignments.
This approach varies slightly from legislative bargaining models that express utility of a
legislator who serves an individual jurisdiction. I assume legislators respond to
constituents by serving on a subcommittee that oversees bureaus that benefit his or her
constituents (Niskanen, 1971; 1975; 1991; 2008). I focus on the subcommittee, because
subcommittees specialize in policies that impact a small number of goods. This leads to
my next assumption about legislators. I assume that legislators have a high demand for
the output of the bureaus their congressional subcommittee oversees and spend most of

28

Reelection may also be a function of lobbyist support and other factors important to constituents.
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their time making decisions about provision of the bureau’s output. Therefore, I focus on
how a legislator values the good produced by his or her bureau, and not public spending
in general.
The assumptions about the role of a legislator serving on a subcommittee are
critical to evaluate how legislators work together to decide on type of public provision. I
assume that legislators serving on the same subcommittees all have a high demand for the
good their subcommittee oversees, even if they disagree on how to provide the good.
Therefore, they have an incentive to cooperate to achieve a policy outcome, even if they
disagree on policy details, because cooperation allows for each legislator to get their
preferred level of g subject to institutional constraints. Therefore, I assume that legislators
serving on the same subcommittee have an incentive to cooperate to increase g ij. I revisit
the cooperative legislature discussed in Besley and Coate (2003). They argue that
cooperative legislators work together to provide a level of the public good that maximizes
the sum of their utilities: ΣUi=1,2 [θi ((1-k)lngi + kgj)] subject to a budget constraint p/2(gi
+ gj). The model assumes two legislators, denoted by i, for simplicity. In this model, θ i is
a preference parameter, k is the degree of spillovers associated with the good distributed
in district i, gi, and the good distributed in district j, gj. Legislator i’s utility is a function
of the amount of good retained in his or her own district i and the amount of spillovers
that go to district j.
Although Besley and Coate’s model applies to the whole legislature, I apply the
model only to the subcommittee to explain decision-making. I assume that legislators
who serve on the same subcommittee are cooperative and maximize the sum of their
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utility functions.29 Revisiting Model (1), I assume two legislators for simplicity, where i
= 1,2. If two legislators cooperate to maximize their joint surplus, they work together to
get their preferred levels of g1j. Therefore, the two legislators, 1 and 2, on subcommittee 1
will find the amount that satisfies Maxr,g∑

(U11(r(g11)1, g11, θ1) + U21(r(g21)2, g21, θ2)).

With more than two legislators, the utility maximization of legislator i on subcommittee j
is Maxr,g ∑

Uij(r(gij)i, gij, θi), where i = 1, 2, …, n.

To find the utility-maximizing solution, I define the constraint. Current legislative
bargaining models put forth rules under which legislators will agree to a policy. For
example, Knight (2004) assumes that a legislator will vote for a policy proposal if the
benefit to his or her constituents exceeds his or her jurisdiction’s share of taxes for that
good. He defines utility as having a functional form, h. The share a jurisdiction pays for
the good, g, is total taxes, τ, divided by the number of people within that jurisdiction, N.
Therefore, a legislator will support spending if utility is greater than or equal to share of
taxes: h(g) > τ /N. Furthermore, other legislative bargaining models show that a policy
will pass if the majority of legislators ((i/2) + 1) agree to the policy. However, I
reconsider the constraint to explain the decision to centralize or decentralize a good.
I focus on redefining the constraint a legislator faces during the decision-making
process by proposing an alternative way to think about the institutions in which
legislators make decisions. Legislators are responsible for introducing policy proposals
before the proposals pass through the legislature to be voted upon by the legislative body.
I consider the moment when a legislator considers a policy proposal, which will

29

I do not assume that the legislature as a whole is necessarily cooperative. The legislature as a whole can
be uncooperative at a moment in time without impacting the cooperativeness of a subcommittee.
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inevitably passed through an official process replete with political and policy preferences.
Therefore, a legislator will face some level of political costs associated with his or her
effort to promote a policy proposal. Some models similar costs directly into legislator i’s
utility function, such as transaction costs: ui = λri + piR, where r is the rents of holding
office, λ is the transaction cost associated with collecting rents to office, and p iR is the
probability of getting reelected (e.g. Persson et al., 2000; Janeba and Schjelderup, 2009).
However, these models do not include costs of vying for reelection and a legislator’s
limited resources utilized to advocate for their preferred policies.
Although not applied to the centralization-decentralization tradeoff, Woon (2009)
argues that legislators have limited resources to perform legislative duties and achieve
policy objectives. Therefore, legislators pursue activities that produce the largest benefits
subject to a constraint. Following this logic, I include a constraint to account for a
legislator’s limited resources that affect decision making. The constraint function here is
different from standard approaches to modeling a constraint. Instead of modeling income,
prices, and quantity, I consider a legislator’s political resources used to support a specific
type of policy provision. These resources are monetary and nonmonetary resources that
assist a legislator in advocating for a certain policy output. The costs in the constraint are
the political price associated with producing a level of output, gij, or competing for
reelection, r(gij)ij. I define the constraint for legislator i on subcommittee j as
Yij = Prr(gij)ij + Pggij

(2)
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where Y is a legislator’s total resources, P r is the political price associated with increasing
the probability of getting reelected, and Pg is the political price associated with
implementing legislator i’s preferred level of g.
This newly defined constraint function warrants further description. Total
resources, Y, include all monetary and nonmonetary political resources that help a
legislator to perform his or her job, which may include time, effort, and political
resources. These resources are used to create policy proposals to produce some level of
the good and to compete for reelection. Policy proposals for the good and competition for
reelection consume total resources as there are political costs associated with each one.
The political price of reelection includes activities such as campaigning and rallying
support from interest groups. The political price of the good, as described in further detail
below, is the price associated with creating and garnering support for a policy proposal. I
argue that this price is determined by the political platforms of legislators, which may be
divided across party lines. It is specific to the good and type of provision proposed.
Support for a specific good depends on legislators’ political platforms. The type of
provision (centralized or decentralized) determines how much of the good is produced. If
a majority of legislators are willing to vote for centralized provision of a specific good,
we should expect there to be a lower political price associated with a centralized policy
proposal. Conversely, if support for centralized provision of a specific good is divided
across party lines, we should expect a higher political price associated with a centralized
policy proposal. This is the case because it will be more difficult for a legislator to garner
votes for his or her policy proposal. The price will inevitably be lower for decentralized
provision in the latter case as there will be less output with decentralized provision.
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Using the constraint function, we can see how political price affects the optimal
outcome. I apply the Besley and Coate (2003) model to subcommittees by assuming that
legislators serving on the same subcommittee share the same preferences. In other words,
each subcommittee member has a high demand for the output of the bureaucracy he or
she oversees and reelection, making each subcommittee a cooperative subunit inside the
legislature. Furthermore, legislators serving on the same subcommittee have an incentive
to cooperate, because cooperation allows each legislator to receive his or her preferred
level of g. Therefore, legislators have the incentive to maximize the sum of the utilities of
all legislators serving on the same subcommittee. Then the utility-maximizing solution
for legislators serving on subcommittee j is Maxr,g ∑

Uij(r(gij)i, gij, θi) subject to Yi =

Prrij + Pggij.
Therefore, the utility-maximizing solution is where the marginal rate of substitution of
the sum of legislators’ utilities is equal to the political price ratio.
ΣUjr/ΣUjg = Pr/Pg.

(3)

In other words, cooperative legislators choose an amount of the bureau’s good and the
likelihood of reelection that provide the highest amount of utility given the constraint.
The contribution of this model is Pg, the price of making a decision, which is
specific to each good. It also has one of two values depending on the type of provision
(centralized or decentralized) a legislator proposes for an individual good. The magnitude
of the difference in the values of Pg under each type of proposed provision depends on the
political climate surrounding that particular good at a given moment in time. For
politically contentious policy issues, the difference in the political price of proposing a
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centralized policy can be larger than the political price of proposing a decentralized
policy compared to policy issues that are not politically contentious as decentralized
output requires less federal funding and results in lower amount of the good produced.
Therefore, it is less costly for a legislator to garner support for decentralized provision
when a majority of legislators do not support centralized provision of a specific good.
When political prices of centralized policy proposals are higher than those of
decentralized policy proposals, the centralized policy proposal reduces legislators’
utilities compared to decentralized policy proposals.
I also argue that the level of spillovers should be directly incorporated into P g
instead of the utility function. A consideration of spillovers and the appropriate level of
government undoubtedly implicitly or explicitly affects how easily a legislator can
advocate for each type of public provision. While the exact function of P g can depend on
several factors, we can think of a simplistic function to show the relationship between the
political climate of a good, spillovers, and how they simultaneously affect P g. For
example, consider a possible function of P g with a centralized policy proposal:
Pg = h(c)/kp

(4)

where h is a functional form, c the size of the controversy associated with a centralized
policy proposal, and kp is the size of the spillover associated with the proposed level of
centralized provision. This simplistic model shows when centralized policy proposals
have the highest political prices: when controversy over preferences for a centralized
policy proposal is large and spillovers of an actual centralized policy are small. In this
example, decentralized provision may be preferred.
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I use this conceptual model to explain why clean energy remains decentralized in
the United States. Assuming a legislator values clean energy and wants to allocate funds
to increase clean energy output, the legislator has two choices: (1) advocate for a
centralized policy, or (2) advocate for a decentralized policy. The outcome, shown in
equation (3), is affected by values of Pg. Using the simplistic formula in equation (4), we
can compare Pg under both centralization and decentralization provision proposals. I
consider how clean energy affects Pg. The literature argues that centralized clean energy
policy is controversial among policymakers, on average. However, the value of P g has a
different value for a decentralized policy proposal. Although spillovers are large, the
value level of controversy over the type of provision for the specific policy is smaller.
Therefore, the total price of a decentralized policy proposal, P g, is smaller for a
decentralized energy policy proposal.
We can also consider the utility function in its entirety to understand why
policymakers allocate funds to support decentralized provision of clean energy. Looking
at equation (4), we can think about how political prices affect the attainable levels of r
and g. First, we can assume that the probability of reelection is similar under both
scenarios. If legislators and the public shares similar preferences for the good, the
probability of reelection will increase with a large output under centralization and
decentralization. This occurs because centralized output increases g for everyone, even if
disproportionately across districts, and decentralized output will increase output for
legislators’ respective districts. However, the overall level of g will not be the same in
both scenarios. Decentralized provision can increase g if the federal government utilizes
grants to increase local spending or allows for policy provisions that encourage local
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governments to spend on g. However, legislators must allocate a certain level of federal
spending on g to provide a centralized output. If political prices associated with
centralized provision due to controversy surrounding a specific good are high,
decentralized provision is the likely outcome under this model. If controversy
surrounding a policy issue is low, centralized provision is more likely if spillovers are
large.
While I only consider a legislator’s utility within his or her role on a
subcommittee, we can also use this framework to think about the subcommittee’s strategy
to pass a policy proposal through the legislature. Individual legislators introduce policy
proposals but must expend resources to gain votes for their proposals from other
legislators. Legislators working together on a subcommittee have a high demand for the
good’s output and are incentivized to cooperate within the subcommittee. However,
legislators not serving on that same subcommittee are less likely to have a high demand
for the good’s output. Therefore, there are naturally higher political prices when
subcommittees need the whole legislature to agree to a policy proposal. It is plausible that
subcommittees push forward the proposals that both maximize utility within the
subcommittee and have the greatest chance of being approved by the legislature. In the
case of a controversial policy like clean energy, the magnitude of political price
associated with decentralized policies is small relative to a centralized clean energy
policy. This could explain why decentralized policies have passed the legislature.
The focus of this paper is controversial policies, but a brief discussion of policies
that are not highly controversial is relevant as well. Perhaps all policies can arguably be
characterized as “controversial” to some extent as the court system is inundated with
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cases concerning a variety of policies. However, the controversy of policy output is not
always a factor that inhibits adoption of a solution. Political parties may disagree on how
much they should respond to policy problem but generally agree on an approach.
Therefore, if the policy issue or potential solutions are not controversial, legislators may
base the decision on efficiency grounds, the lowest cost, or the best feasible policy
solution to address the policy problem. Regardless of how legislators come to a decision,
the key point is that successful policies are ones where the political price are relatively
low. For example, opposing political parties may disagree on the amount of national
defense that should be provided publicly, but this good is relatively noncontroversial as
most legislators agree that the federal government should provide this good.

4.5 Implications for Policy
The conceptual analysis put forth in this chapter makes assumptions about legislators and
their role as subcommittee members. I consider the stage in the decision-making process
where legislators consider policy proposals. I assume that legislators have utility
functions that are unique to their role on a legislative subcommittee: utility for a legislator
is a function of reelection and the good produced by the committee’s bureau. I also
assume that legislators have a high demand for the output of the bureau they oversee.
Given these assumptions, the utility-maximizing decision involves a tradeoff of the
political price associated with passing a policy under each type of provision. In other
words, the legislator might agree that centralized clean energy policy can be effective but
vote for a decentralized clean energy policy because high political prices limit a
legislator’s ability to pass a centralized policy proposal. The key takeaway is that
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decentralized policy leads to greater probability of a policy outcome for a certain level of
controversy associated with the nature of the policy.
This model can help us think about decentralized clean energy policy in the
United States. One bureau through which clean energy is passed is the U.S. Department
of Energy. The subcommittees in both the U.S. Senate and House of Representatives
responsible for overseeing the DOE have both conservative and liberal congressional
members. One might argue that congressional members who have different ideologies
would likely have different preferences, even if they serve on the same congressional
subcommittee. However, I argue that they both still intrinsically value the output of the
bureau and getting reelected. For example, some clean energy policy can encompass
several benefits and appeal to both ideologies. Clean energy can produce local
environmental benefits, reduce energy costs for businesses and residents, and improve
energy security. While legislators may have different ideas about clean energy policy,
preferences may converge if clean energy output is provided through the bureau their
respective subcommittee oversees.
There might also be cases where legislators who value fossil fuel energy pursue
subcommittee membership on the same subcommittee overseeing clean energy. The
model is still beneficial in explaining legislative behavior in this case. The model requires
legislators to cooperate to pass some level of the good. However, subcommittees only
require a majority of legislators to agree to a policy proposal to pass it out of committee.
If there are a subset of subcommittee members on the same subcommittee who share the
same preferences, that subset of legislators is still incentivized to cooperate to pass some
level of g.
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Although this analysis of legislative behavior and utility maximization helps us to
understand decentralization of clean energy policy, the conceptual model does not
address how noncontroversial policies may be decentralized given normative economic
arguments for centralization. According to this model, legislators will push for
centralized policies when the political price is low, assuming the output should be
centralized from a normative economic perspective. However, we can imagine a case
where a legislator wants to allocate fiscal transfers to his or her constituents through
decentralized policy even if it is not controversial. One example might be education
policy in the United States. Until recent years, education policy in the United States was
fairly decentralized (DeBoer, 2012). I argue that this policy issue is relatively
uncontroversial, because most legislators would agree that there are benefits of having an
educated workforce. Moreover, education policy at the local level undoubtedly has large,
positive externalities, because educated persons are mobile. Therefore, from a normative
economics perspective, education should be centralized, and perhaps this is why the
United States has moved towards centralization of education policy.
Another limitation of this analysis is that it only considers a legislator’s decision
on policy provision. It does not consider other important actors in the policy process,
such as the president and the courts. The president can be quite influential in
intergovernmental transfers for decentralized policies (e.g. Hudak, 2014). Moreover,
legislators work within the constraints of the law. Along these same lines, this analysis
does not formally consider the role of legislators who do not serve on the subcommittee
and bureaucrats who help to carry out these policies. This model only considers them in

65

relation to how they are involved in a legislator’s decision-making process, i.e. the
political price associated with reelection and bargaining for policy provision.
Lastly, this analysis does not take into consideration the current state of clean
energy policy in the United States. National policy could preempt state and local clean
energy policies if not designed by policymakers who consider the current state of
subnational policies. Furthermore, if states do not want federal policy, it may be true that
legislators hope to increase their probability of reelection by meeting states’ demands.
Any further analysis of the legislator’s role in the decision to either decentralize or
centralize clean energy policy could consider these factors.
The following chapters evaluate the theoretical argument put forth in this chapter.
Chapter Five offers a direct empirical test of the conceptual model by examining how the
political price associated with renewable energy impacts the probability of proposing
decentralized funding for renewable energy provision.
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CHAPTER FIVE: AN EMPIRICAL EVALUATION OF A LEGISLATOR’S
CHOICE OF DECENTRALIZED FUNDING FOR RENEWABLE ENERGY
5.1 Introduction
The previous chapter put forth a theoretical framework to explain why legislators propose
funding for decentralized provision of renewable energy. Chapter Four argues that when
policy proposals for centralized renewable energy development have a high a political
price, legislators are incentivized to propose funding for decentralized renewable energy
output. The model seeks to explain why we observe decentralized renewable energy in
the U.S. even though there are large spillovers associated with renewable energy
production. This chapter empirically evaluates the theoretical argument of Chapter Four
by asking if legislators are more likely to propose decentralized funding for renewable
energy policies when the associated political price is lower than centralized policy
proposals at the time of a policy proposal.
To evaluate legislators’ initial funding decisions, I start by considering the first
observable moment in the decision-making process. Legislators document their initial
policy proposals by introducing new bills in the legislature. Thus each introduced bill
represents an initial, strategic decision for a preferred policy output by the bill sponsor
(Woon, 2008). The legislator introduces a new bill with the expectation that the whole
legislature will vote upon that proposal later in the legislative process. Relating this to the
theoretical model in the previous chapter, we should expect a legislator to strategically
choose either decentralized or centralized funding for renewable energy output subject to
institutional constraints at the time of the policy proposal. Therefore, this chapter
analyzes renewable energy bills to observe whether the political price of renewable

67

energy policymaking at the time of the bill’s introduction affected a legislator’s choice of
funding for either centralized or decentralized renewable energy provision.
I also consider the main institutions in which legislators make decisions,
legislative committees, as considered in the theoretical model in Chapter Four.
Legislators serve on one or more congressional committees that have jurisdiction over a
limited number of policy issues and are responsible for considering legislation introduced
on those policy issues. Congressional committees can facilitate legislative participation in
information gathering, discussion, proposing ideas, and drafting or amending proposed
bills. Congressional committees also play a vital role in helping bills move through
Congress (Krehbiel et al., 1987). Shepsle and Weingast (1987) argue that the ability for
committees to be involved in the process at multiple points makes them a powerful part
of the legislative process. Congressional committees also serve as intermediaries between
principals and agents (Kiewiet and McCubbins, 1991). Therefore, the congressional
committee can be directly tied to all legislative decisions, including funding decisions.
This chapter proceeds by looking at the specific congressional committees responsible for
overseeing renewable energy policy.
Two congressional committees within the U.S. Congress have primary
jurisdiction over energy policy, although other congressional committees can make
decisions on energy-related bills when the bill also involves the policy jurisdiction of
more than one congressional committee. The U.S. House Energy and Commerce
Committee and the U.S. Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources have
primary jurisdiction over national energy policy and other policy issues. 30 Both have
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In other words, these committees are designed to receive any energy-related bill introduced by a
legislator.
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subcommittees that concentrate on energy infrastructure and conservation. 31 The House
Energy subcommittee focuses on energy policies, regulations, utilities, and agencies and
commissions responsible for overseeing energy programs, which are the U.S. Department
of Energy, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission (“Energy Jurisdiction,” 2017). The committee’s jurisdiction includes fossil
fuel, renewable, and nuclear energy. The Senate Energy subcommittee has jurisdiction
over specific energy projects, research, and development and jurisdiction over agencies
overseeing these projects, such as the U.S. Department of Energy’s National Laboratories
(“Jurisdiction,” n.d.). The jurisdiction of this subcommittee includes oil and gas and
nuclear, coal, solar, and synthetic fuel energy.
This chapter explores legislative decisions by analyzing the content of energy
bills introduced, by any U.S. legislator, that were assigned to the U.S. House of
Representatives’ Energy and Commerce Committee from 1993 to 2014, which includes
the 103rd to the 113th Congresses.32 I focus on bills that are assigned to this specific
committee, because this committee is designed to receive bills primarily related to
energy. Although I am unable to search for bills related to renewable energy specifically,
I use the subset of energy bills to manually search each bill for renewable energy
provisions. This process allows me to observe bills that are the product of legislative
decisions related to renewable energy provision.

31

The information regarding policy jurisdiction of the U.S. Senate and U.S. House Energy Committees and
subcommittees is based on the committee descriptions provided as of March 2018. The description of and
the actual policy jurisdiction is subject to change over time.
32
The bills introduced in this committee during this time were introduced by both committee and noncommittee members.
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Each bill represents a set of choices made by a legislator (or a set of legislators)
who introduced that particular policy proposal at that moment in time. I look at
introduced bills to observe a legislator’s initial decision on renewable energy funding and
provision. I hypothesize that legislators are less likely to propose decentralized funding
for renewable energy (as observed by the content in the bill) at the moment in time when
the political price of passing a renewable energy policy is low. Since political price is
unobservable, I propose a binary proxy variable to measure whether the political price of
renewable energy policymaking was low at the time a legislator introduces a renewable
energy bill, equal to 1 if both the bill sponsor and the majority of the U.S. Congress are
Democrat at the time of a bill’s proposal.33 I run a linear probability model to estimate a
legislator’s likelihood of including funding for decentralized renewable energy in a
renewable energy bill. The findings suggest that legislators are less likely to propose a
bill that includes funding for decentralized renewable energy development when the
political price is low. I include alternative models as robustness checks to support this
finding.
To my knowledge, no study asks how the political climate of a specific policy
issue affects funding decisions in the way I propose in this chapter. Instead, the literature
discusses legislative preferences and legislative characteristics that might have an effect
on all legislative decisions. The following section discusses these studies to inform the
empirical model put forth in this chapter. I first consider legislators’ preferences that
could directly influence funding decisions. Legislative preferences are at least partially
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I measure the political ideology of the whole U.S. Congress instead of just the subcommittee since
legislators make strategic decisions regarding legislation knowing that the bill, if passed through
committee, will only be passed subject to the majority of Congress agreeing to the bill.
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revealed by their choice of congressional committees on which they serve. Therefore, I
review studies pertaining to a legislator’s decision to join a congressional committee,
which signals legislative preferences that can also affect decisions. This literature serves
as the foundation for the legislative bargaining literature, also discussed in the proceeding
sections, which directly considers legislative decision making.

5.2 Preferences Revealed by Committee Choice and Proposed Legislation
As discussed in Chapter Four, legislators have preferences that are expected to impact
their decisions, including the congressional committee(s) on which they choose to serve.
Therefore, studies on congressional committee formation can help motivate the empirical
model as they reveal legislative preferences. 34 The literature argues that the committee on
which a legislator serves is tied to issues legislators most value, because legislators vie
over seats on their most preferred committees and essentially give up the right over
policy issues of other committees (Weingast and Marshall, 1988). The committee can
serve as a means for legislators to achieve policy goals related to the committee’s policy
jurisdiction, specifically influencing the policy output of the bureaus they oversee
(Weingast and Moran, 1983). However, Kellerman and Shepsle (2009) suggest that
committee seniority might play a role in a legislator’s ability to influence policy output,
as suggested by the positive association between committee seniority and the likelihood
of a committee member’s bill being adopted.

34

Since legislators self-select into committees, there is likely endogeneity in the effect of committee
membership on legislative decision making. Therefore, I do not imply that causality exists between
committee membership and the dependent variable.
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Studies also focus on the strength of legislators’ policy preferences while serving
on congressional committees. Weingast and Marshall (1988) and Woon (2009) argue that
congressional committees represent preference outliers for policy issues with the
committee’s jurisdiction since legislators self-select into congressional committees.
Kreibel (2004; 1990) disagrees, arguing that most congressional committees are
representative of the legislature at large and fit no specific type of preferences. Instead,
only a subset of congressional committees represents those described by Weingast and
Marshall. Epstein and O’Halloran (2001) argue that the strength of preferences vary by
type of committee, observing that committees over more information-driven issues are
more representative of the legislature at large. They find bias only in committees that
cover broad policies issues and those responsible for policies targeting specific groups.
It is conceptually unclear how the literature translates to preferences within the
U.S. House Energy committee. The potential for strong energy preferences could depend
on whether this committee is more information-driven or focused on energy projects that
benefit a subset of the population. Preferences can also depend on the level of benefits
provided to committee members’ constituents, as different groups of constituents would
benefit differently. Therefore, the literature does not suggest whether bills proposed by
members of the U.S. House Energy committee will be significantly different from bills
proposed by non-committee members.
The literature also examines the relationship between committee choice and
constituents’ preferences (Adler and Lapinski, 1997; Weingast and Marshall, 1988).
Congressional committees that provide benefits to all districts are desirable by more
legislators. Examples include committees with jurisdiction over spending and taxes.
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Since the pool of legislators who desire these committees is larger, we should expect the
committee composition to be more representative of the legislature at large when
compared to committees that are desired by a smaller number of legislators. Conversely,
legislators will choose a committee with a more specialized policy jurisdiction only if the
benefits provided by the committee to his or her constituents are greater than the benefits
provided by committees with broader jurisdictions. Energy committees are cited as
examples in the literature as having a specialized jurisdiction. Therefore, we might expect
legislators who serve on energy committees to be from districts that have the greatest
interests in energy, which could lead to a difference in funding proposals between
committee members and non-members.
This chapter builds on the assumption that legislators reveal policy preferences
through the legislation they introduce. Consistent with the theoretical model proposed in
the previous chapter, studies argue that the content of the bill is a result of strategic
behavior by sponsors. The decision to sponsor a bill can depend on the perception of the
sponsor’s constituency (Mayhew, 1974). Woon (2008) claims that the bill’s content is
included based on a legislator’s knowledge that the outcome of the legislation will be
subject to other legislators. Woon (2009) explains that legislators have limited resources
and focus on issues with the perceived highest benefits subject to constraints. Since this is
one of the first stages where legislators reveal their preferences, the decision to sponsor a
bill might be a better indicator of policy objectives than bill votes (Talbert and Potoski,
2002; Desposato et al., 2011). Although, the preferences as revealed in the bill might be
an imperfect measure as institutional factors also affect policy preferences (Mouw and
Mackuen, 1992).
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5.3 Legislative Bargaining and Outcomes
Studies in legislative bargaining discuss how institutional factors affect legislative
decision making. To my knowledge, no study considers the choice to use decentralized
funding in the same context as this study. However, legislative bargaining models do
consider the tradeoff between centralized and decentralized provision and preferences for
public spending. Therefore, I revisit the legislative bargaining models as discussed in the
previous chapter and include additional studies in legislative bargaining further inform
the empirical model that follows. These studies point to the significance of preferences,
benefits to constituents, and institutional incentives in legislative decision-making.
Studies in legislative bargaining discuss how legislators’ preferences for public
spending affect their decisions, arguing that legislators seek to minimize their own
district’s spending on the good. The Baron and Ferejohn model hypothesizes that
legislators focus on minimizing overall costs of the public output but also vote for
projects when benefits to their district exceed their district’s share of the total cost (Baron
and Ferejohn, 1987; 1989; Baron, 1991). According to the model, politically powerful
legislators are able to secure spending, causing the good to be overprovided in their
respective districts and underprovided in others. Besley and Coate (2003) show the
misallocation of public spending when a legislature is cooperative. In their model,
cooperative legislators work together to increase their shared utility, resulting in
overspending in their respective jurisdictions. Knight (2004) studies spending decisions
by analyzing Congressional votes in support of spending on transportation projects and
concludes that legislators attempt to reduce overall spending to reduce their district’s
share of the tax burden. Instead, legislators seek to increase own-district benefits while
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considering their district’s share of the costs. Lorz and Willmann (2005) study factors
that affect the amount of centralization of goods and argue that elected leaders tend to
focus on reducing local tax burdens of their constituents. We can infer from these studies
that legislators from districts that benefit the most from renewable energy might be more
likely to propose all types of funding for renewable energy.
Legislative bargaining models also point out the significance of proposal power in
legislative decision making. The legislature consists of committee members who have
agenda-setting power over policy issues that fall within their respective jurisdictions
(Persson and Tabellini, 2002; Krehbiel, 1990). Persson and Tabellini argue that
committee structure provides legislators with power that affects their decisions on
spending. Knight (2005) finds that legislative committee members have a greater
likelihood of getting projects funded. In the context of this study, committee members
might be more likely to propose funding if they know that they have a greater likelihood
of getting funding for the projects they propose. However, Persson and Tabellini argue
that institutional factors limit proposal power by providing the ability for other legislators
to amend proposed policies and limiting the jurisdiction of each congressional committee.
The significance of constituents is one of the most consistently considered factors
in legislative bargaining models. Baron and Ferejohn (1989) argue that legislators are
uncooperative and make strategic decisions to serve their respective constituents after
considering decisions that other legislators will make during the policy process. The most
notable legislative bargaining models assume that legislators are direct representatives of
their constituents (e.g. Lockwood, 2002; Besley and Coate, 2003). The implication is that
legislators make choices on behalf of the local jurisdictions they represent, ignoring
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regional or national preferences (Lockwood 2005). This assumption implies that a
legislator’s willingness to cooperate depends on his or her perception of whether their
jurisdiction will benefit. Some scholars describe this behavior as pork-barreling, meaning
that spending decisions can directly and disproportionately benefit a legislator’s
constituents (e.g. Alesina and Tabellini, 1990; Volden and Wiseman, 2007; Battaglini
and Coate, 2008).
Finally, studies in legislative bargaining discuss how strategic behavior can
influence legislators’ decisions. Besley and Coate (2003) show how legislators’
willingness to cooperate affects the level and allocation of public spending by showing
overspending in some districts when legislators seek to maximize the sum of their
utilities. Other models discuss the importance of side payments between legislators to
support each other’s policies (e.g. Segendor, 1998; Lockwood, 2005). Lockwood argues
that legislators make personal transfers to other legislators when the legislature is
cooperative, which makes it appear that legislators maximize the sum of their utilities.
Persson and Tabellini (2002) explain that legislators might also spend money to benefit
other legislators to get them to agree to their decisions. These models help us to
understand that some decisions legislators make, especially concerning policy specifics
such as funding, could be motivated by interpersonal agreements between legislators.

5.4 Data and Methods
Scholars utilize voting data on congressional bills to study legislative decisions on public
spending (e.g. Knight, 2005). However, voting data on renewable energy bills cannot
feasibly be separated from voting data on bills regarding all other types of energy.
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Therefore, I utilize the content in congressional bills to study legislative decisions. Each
bill represents a set of choices made by a legislator at a specific moment in time.
Utilizing the content in proposed bills is the most feasible method to fully observe
legislators’ initial decisions regarding renewable energy funding. This allows me to
directly observe a legislator’s initial choice of funding mechanism for renewable energy
he or she proposes for renewable energy provision. I use introduced legislative bills
assigned to the U.S. House Energy Committee, which is the House committee with
primary jurisdiction over renewable energy.
I collect data from the U.S. Library of Congress on all introduced energy bills that
were assigned to the House Energy Committee during the 103rd to 113th Congresses,
which includes years 1993 to 2014. I look only at bills assigned to this committee,
because bills directly related to energy development are likely assigned to this committee
as it has the primary jurisdiction over energy policy. There were 1,010 bills in the U.S.
House Energy Committee that directly pertained to energy during the period in this
analysis.35
In order to empirically examine legislators’ decisions to utilize grants, I create a
list of variables based on the content of each bill introduced in this committee over this
period. I first coded each bill based on type of energy and funding mechanism, if any,
proposed in the bill. The House Energy Committee oversees all types of energy-related
legislation, including bills related to renewable and non-renewable energy. I coded each
bill for the type(s) of energy mentioned using a binary variable based on the following

35

The U.S. Library of Congress allows congressional bills to be searched by committee and subject area.
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categories: renewable energy, fossil fuel energy, and nuclear energy. This allowed me to
differentiate between bills that were introduced with the main purpose to develop
renewable energy from bills that were not introduced mainly to develop renewable
energy.36 For example, a bill that includes provisions for both solar panels and coal would
be coded with a 1 for renewable energy and a 1 for fossil fuel. 37 Coding as such allows
me to differentiate bills that include a provision for renewable energy bills along with
provisions for other types of energy from bills that solely focus on renewable energy.
A portion of the energy bills introduced in the US House Energy Committee had
provisions for centralized funding, decentralized funding, or both. In other words, some
bills focused narrowly on funding energy development either at the federal or subnational
level, and other bills provided a comprehensive funding package to include both federal
and subnational funding for renewable energy development. Therefore, I created four
additional binary coding variables based on funding mechanisms included in the bill,
which I used to create the dependent variable and subset the data for robustness checks. I
coded bills for decentralized funding if the bill included proposals for intergovernmental
fiscal transfers to support subnational energy development. I coded bills for centralized
funding if the bill included any provision that appropriates money or requires a federal
agency to allocate funding towards centralized energy development. I also made note of
whether the proposal for funding was targeted towards renewable energy specifically.

36

For example, a bill that includes various types of energy is not designed specifically to develop
renewable energy. Instead, the purpose of the bill might be to develop a research program but mentions
each type of energy for which the funding can be used.
37
Only bills that directly mentioned a type of energy were coded with a 1 to denote that the energy is
included in the bill. For example, bills relating to regulations for car manufacturers were included in the
1,010 energy bills from the U.S. Library of Congress. In this specific example, I would code these bill as “0”
for all types of energy unless the bill specifically mentioned a renewable or fossil fuel source.
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Table 5.1 lists the four binary coding variables and a description of each one. The
criteria are based on whether a bill included funding for 1) decentralized energy output
for any type of energy, 2) centralized energy output for any type of energy, 3)
decentralized renewable energy output, and 4) centralized renewable energy output. The
four variables are not mutually exclusive. For example, a bill that proposes centralized
and decentralized funding for renewable energy received a “1” for all four criteria. Bills
that do not include any funding mechanism received a “0” for all four criteria. The
primary dependent variable is equal to 1 if the introduced bill contains a provision for
funding to support decentralized renewable energy, 0 otherwise.
Table 5.1
Descriptions of the Types of Funding Mechanism Included in Energy Bills
Introduced in the U.S. House Energy Committee
Categorical Variable
Proposes Funding for Decentralization

Description
Bills that propose decentralized funding
for any type of energy, including
renewable energy.
Bills that propose centralized funding
for any type of energy, including
renewable energy.
Bills that propose decentralized funding
for renewable energy.
Bills that propose decentralized funding
for renewable energy.

Proposes Funding for Centralization
Proposes Funding for Decentralized RE
Proposes Funding for Centralized RE
Source: U.S. Library of Congress

Legislators proposed centralized and decentralized funding mechanisms for
several types of renewable energy development. The majority of bills with a funding
mechanism for centralized renewable energy output directed funding to a federal agency,
giving that agency direct oversight of renewable energy development. The majority of
bills with a funding mechanism for decentralized renewable energy output included a
grant program or similar type of financial assistance to encourage local development of
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renewable energy. These are generally targeted towards local governments, or, in some
cases, nonprofits. Some bills targeted renewable energy generally while others specified
types of renewable energy. Bills that included both centralized and decentralized
provision generally directed a federal agency to produce renewable output but also
included assistance to local governments for renewable energy output.
Table 5.2 provides summary statistics for the 1,010 energy bills. Looking at both
renewable energy and nonrenewable energy bills, 235 bills include a funding to support
decentralized energy output, and 250 bills include funding to support centralized energy
output. Furthermore, 385 of all energy bills mention renewable energy. Of all bills that
include renewable energy, 113 bills propose funding for decentralized renewable energy
output, and 82 bills propose funding for centralized renewable energy output.
Table 5.2
Summary Statistics, All Energy Bills
Variable
Proposes Funding for Decentralization
Proposes Funding for Centralization
Mention Renewable Energy
Proposes Funding for Decentralized RE
Proposes Funding for Centralized RE

n = 1,010
Count
235
250
385
113
82

Mean
0.23
0.25
0.38
0.12
0.8

Min
0
0
0
0
0

Max
1
1
1
1
1

Source: U.S. Library of Congress

Table 5.3 includes only the 385 introduced bills that include renewable energy.
The table includes the percentage of renewable energy bills that include funding for
centralized and decentralized renewable energy output. Of the 385 renewable energy bills
proposed over this period, 29 percent include funding for decentralized renewable
energy, and 21 percent include funding for centralized renewable energy. Furthermore,
17 percent of bills include funding for only decentralized renewable energy, meaning that
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the proposed bill includes decentralized funding for renewable energy projects and no
other forms of energy. For example, this would not include a bill that proposes a grant for
all types of energy.
Table 5.3
Summary Statistics, All Renewable Energy Bills
n = 385
Variable
Count
Proposes Funding for Decentralized RE
113
Proposes Funding for Decentralized RE Only
65
Proposes Funding for Centralized RE
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Mean
0.29
0.17
0.21

Min
0
0
0

Max
1
1
1

Source: U.S. Library of Congress

As shown in Figure 5.1, renewable energy bills were proposed in the U.S. House
Energy Committee during all Congresses in this analysis. Over the span from the 103 rd to
the 113th Congresses, the fewest number of renewable energy bills, 10, were introduced
during the 103rd Congress, and the most, 78, were introduced during the 110 th Congress.
Bills with at least one provision for renewable energy accounted for 26 to 52 percent of
all energy-related bills introduced in the U.S. House of Representatives Energy
Committee during this period. The figure also shows the number of bills during each
Congress that contained at least one provision for funding decentralized renewable
energy, which also varied by Congress. There was only one bill containing a provision
for funding decentralized renewable energy introduced during the 103 rd Congress, which
was the fewest number introduced during this period. The largest number of bills
containing a provision for decentralized renewable energy funding, 31, was introduced
during the 110th Congress.38

38

The final model includes both fixed effects and a dummy variable equal to 1 in years after 2008 to
account for the increasing propensity to introduce a bill with a provision for renewable energy.
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Figure 5.1
Frequency of Introduction of Renewable Energy Bills
103rd to 113th Congresses

Source: U.S. Library of Congress

The variable of interest in this analysis is political price. I hypothesize that when
the political price of renewable energy policymaking is high, legislators are more likely
to use fiscal transfers to support decentralized renewable energy output. Since there is no
direct measure available for whether renewable energy is a controversial policy issue in
time t, I create a measure based on the energy literature. As discussed in Chapter One,
renewable energy became a polarized policy issue between Republicans and Democrats
after the 1980s with Democrats more favorable towards renewable energy policies (e.g.
Krosnick and Holbrook, 2000; Fiorina and Abrams, 2008; Dunlap and McCright, 2008).
Therefore, we should expect Democrats to be more likely to support centralized
renewable energy policy during the period analyzed in this chapter and for the
Democratic sponsors to be more likely to propose legislation when there is a majority of
Democratic legislators who are willing to vote favorably on the proposed bill.
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I exploit the expected correlation with political party to create a proxy variable,
which I label as “low political price”. In order for a legislator’s proposed bill to pass
through Congress, the bill must pass the congressional committee and then the
legislature. Therefore, I consider the party affiliation of the sponsor, the congressional
committee, and Congress to create the proxy measure for political price. The House
Energy Committee and Congress were both majority Democrat in the same years. Low
political price is equal to 1 if both the bill sponsor and Congress and the House Energy
Committee are majority Democrat at the time of a bill’s proposal. 39
Consistent with the hypothesis, I expect low political price to be negatively
associated with the likelihood of proposing funding for decentralized renewable energy
development. In other words, the theory predicts that legislators will rely more heavily on
funding for decentralized renewable energy provision when the political price of
renewable energy policy is high. As shown in Table 5.4, the average value for the binary
variable measuring whether the political price is low or high is 0.24, meaning that 91 of
385 bills that contain a provision for renewable energy were introduced during a year in
which the political price of renewable energy policymaking was low. The variable of
interest is equal to 1 in years 1993, 1994, and 2007 to 2010, which is during the 103 rd,
110th, and 111th Congresses.

39

Low political price is equal to 1 only if both the sponsor and the majority Congress are Democrat at the
time of the bill’s proposal. Although Republicans proposed funding for renewable energy during this same
period, I would argue that a Republican sponsor naturally creates a higher political price regardless if
Congress is majority Democrat or majority Republican at the time of the bill’s proposal. In the first case,
the higher political price would result from the sponsor and majority of Congress belonging to opposite
political parties. In the second case, Republicans have historically been less favorable of renewable energy
policies, regardless of the bill sponsor’s political party.
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Table 5.4
Summary Statistics for the Variable of Interest
for Renewable Energy Bills
Variable
Low Political Price

n = 385
Count
385

Mean
0.24

Min
0

Max
1

I include a secondary variable of interest, centralized funding for RE. This
variable is equal to 1 if the bill also has a provision for centralized funding for renewable
energy. The relevance of this variable relates to the theoretical model proposed in
Chapter Four. In the previous chapter, I proposed that legislators choose between funding
centralized renewable energy and decentralized renewable energy, given that a legislator
chooses to provide funding for renewable energy. Therefore, I include this variable to test
whether the choice to offer centralized funding for renewable energy decreases the
likelihood of introducing a provision for decentralized funding for renewable energy.
This variable is included to test whether a significant relationship between the two
variables exists.
Since the model specifically analyzes legislators’ decisions as observed in
introduced bills, I include explanatory variables that measure characteristics of legislators
who primarily sponsored each bill. The literature finds that legislators serve on
committees pertaining to issues they value most and that committee members have a
greater likelihood of getting projects funded as opposed to legislators who are not on that
same committee.40 Therefore, I expect that committee members are more likely to
propose all funding for all issues pertaining to the committee’s jurisdiction. I include

40

A legislator has the ability to propose bills regarding the jurisdiction of any congressional committee,
including the jurisdiction of congressional committees on which they do not serve. In the context of this
analysis, any legislator in Congress can propose a bill related to renewable energy.
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three measures of legislative experience from Stewart and Woon (2017). Committee
member is equal to 1 if a bill’s primary sponsor is a member of the U.S. House Energy
and Commerce Committee in the current year, 0 otherwise. Forty percent of bills that
contained a provision for a grant for only renewable energy (and no other forms of
energy) were sponsored by a member on the energy committee. Forty-two percent of bills
that contained a provision for centralized funding for only renewable energy (and no
other forms of energy) were sponsored by a member on the energy committee. Sponsors
of the other bills with a provision for funding for either centralized or decentralized
renewable energy funding were not on the energy committee.
Following Stewart and Woon (2017), I also include committee seniority, which is
the number of consecutive terms a legislator has served on the U.S. House Energy and
Commerce Committee as of the year in which the bill was introduced. The third measure,
chamber seniority, is included to take into account a legislator’s experience in the
legislature. This is the total number of terms a legislator has served in Congress as of the
year in which a bill was introduced. I also expect seniority to increase the likelihood of
proposing any type of funding since seniority can represent bargaining power.
There is a consensus in the literature that legislators prefer to minimize their
district’s cost while providing benefits to their constituents. Since decentralized funding
is generally a less costly option compared to centralized funding, legislators whose
districts benefit (or are perceived to benefit) from renewable energy grants are expected
to be more willing to propose funding for decentralized renewable energy. Therefore, I
hypothesize that legislators with constituents who benefit disproportionally from local
renewable energy projects might be more likely to propose decentralized funding. I use
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controls for preferences for renewable energy based on data from the U.S. Energy
Information Administration’s State Energy Data System. All energy measures are based
on the primary sponsor’s home state and are lagged to test whether energy usage
influences funding decisions.41 First, I include renewable energy production in a
sponsor’s state, which is the total renewable energy (in billions of BTUs) per capita
produced is legislator i’s state in year t-1. Furthermore, legislators from more energyintensive states might be more motivated to find cleaner, alternative energy. Total Energy
Consumption is the total amount of all energy consumed (in billions of BTUs) per capita
in legislator i’s state in year t-1. Finally, I include fossil fuel energy consumption to
measure preferences that might be opposed to providing funding for renewable energy.
Fossil fuel energy production is the total amount of all energy produced excluding
renewable energy (in billions of BTUs) per capita in legislator i’s state in year t-1.42
Additionally, I consider other details included in each proposed bill to control for
the sponsor’s preferences. I created two binary variables based on the proposal. Fossil
fuel is a binary variable equal to 1 if the bill also mentions any type of fossil fuel energy,
0 otherwise. Since renewable energy is often expressed as a substitute for fossil fuel
energy, legislators who propose a bill that contains a provision for fossil fuel might be
less likely to propose any type of funding for renewable energy.
I also address the theoretical arguments by Segendor (1998) and Lockwood
(2005) who discuss the use of side payments between legislators that decision making,

41

None of the three energy measures are highly correlated with being on the U.S. House Energy and
Commerce Committee. On the energy committee has a correlation coefficient of -0.01 with renewable
energy production per capita, 0.04 with fossil fuel energy production per capita, and 0.06 with total
energy consumption.
42
It should be noted that renewable energy production per capita and fossil fuel energy production per
capita have a correlation coefficient of -0.03, indicating that collinearity is not a concern.
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although it is not clear how they are to be measured in practice. The number of
cosponsors could serve as a proxy for agreements made between legislators to support
each other’s bills. Cosponsors is included in the model and is measured as the number of
cosponsors listed on each bill in the analysis. I include a second variable, bipartisan
support, to capture efforts made by legislators to get members of the opposite party to
support the proposed bill. This is measured as the proportion of cosponsors listed on the
bill who are of the opposite political party as the sponsor.
Finally, I include a series of control variables that are expected to be correlated
with the probability of proposing any type of funding. As discussed in Chapter One,
Democrats are more likely to support renewable energy policies. I control for political
party using a dummy variable equal to 1 if the legislative sponsor is a Democrat, 0
otherwise. Data on Congressional members are from the Brooking’s Institute’s Vital
Statistics on Congress. I also include a few variables to control for preferences for
renewable energy that occurred at the federal level with passage of the American
Recovery and Reinvestment Act as discussed in Chapter Two. Post 2008 is a binary
variable equal to 1 if the year in which the legislation was proposed was after year 2008.
Since Democrats led the efforts of the ARRA, I also include an interaction variable to test
the effects of Democratic support after 2008. This variable is equal to 1 for years 2009 to
2013, 0 otherwise. Finally, I include dummy variables for each year of Congress to
control for the unobserved, fixed factors of each two-year period of Congress that could
affect legislative decision making, such as the increasing propensity to propose funding
for renewable energy. Appendix B provides summary statistics for all control variables.
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5.5 Statistical Model
The main analysis uses data on all renewable energy bills introduced in the U.S. House
Committee on Energy from the 103rd to the 113th Congresses. I include decisions made
by legislators regarding type of funding mechanism used to fund renewable energy as
revealed in the proposed bill. I observe different bills introduced by different member and
non-member legislators during this period.
The hypothesis in this chapter argues that when the political price of renewable
energy policymaking is low, policymakers are less likely to propose funding for
decentralized renewable energy output. Although the previous chapter assumes that
legislators choose between decentralized or centralized funding, the decision to use a
funding mechanism can be more complicated in practice. Legislators can choose no
funding, decentralized funding, centralized funding, or a combination of both centralized
and decentralized funding. However, I narrow the focus of the theory proposed in
Chapter Four to factors affecting the decision to use decentralized funding for renewable
energy development. Since this is a binary decision, I employ a linear probability model
with robust standard errors. Additionally, I include dummy variables to control for the
unobserved effects of each two-year Congress. Model (1) demonstrates the standard
linear probability model.
𝑃 𝑌 =1𝑋

= 𝑋′ 𝛽

(1)

where 𝑌 is a binary variable equal to 1 if a legislator i proposes funding for
decentralized renewable energy during Congress j and 0 otherwise, and 𝑋′ is matrix of
continuous and binary variables that are expected to be correlated with the dependent
variable.
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5.6 Results
I run linear probability models to test the hypothesis that low political price has a
negative and significant relationship with the likelihood of proposing funding for
decentralized renewable energy. The results in Table 5.5 use the same sample of the 383
renewable energy bills introduced in the U.S. House Energy and Commerce Committee
during the 103rd to 113th Congresses.43 The control variables are identical in each model,
but the dependent variables are coded differently. The dependent variable in Model 1 is
equal to 1 if the introduced bill contains a provision for funding to support decentralized
renewable energy. Thus, it includes all bills that propose funding for decentralized
renewable energy, but these bills may also include provisions for decentralized funding
for other types of energy too. Model 2 applies stricter criteria as to whether the dependent
variable is coded as 1. In Model 2, the dependent variable is equal to 1 if the bill proposes
decentralized funding only for renewable energy. In other words, bills that contain a
provision for decentralized funding for renewable energy and another form of energy,
such as fossil fuel or nuclear energy, are coded as 0. Model 2 is more focused on a subset
of bills that are narrowly designed to develop renewable energy.

43

Two bills were dropped in the final models due to missing data for one or more of the control variables.
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Table 5.5
Linear Probability Model Results for Proposals for Funding for Decentralized
Renewable Energy
(1)
RE
Low Political Price
Centralized Funding for RE
Mentions Fossil Fuel Energy
Cosponsors
Bipartisan Support
Post 2008
Democrat
Post 2008 x Democrat
Chamber Seniority
Committee Seniority
Energy Committee Member
RE Production per Cap
FF Energy Production per Cap
Energy Consumption per Cap
Congress 104
Congress 105
Congress 106
Congress 107
Congress 108
Congress 109
Congress 110
Congress 111
Congress 112
Congress 113
Constant
Observations
Standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

-0.195*
(0.099)
0.289***
(0.064)
0.077
(0.054)
0.002**
(0.001)
0.035
(0.074)
0.152*
(0.081)
0.134**
(0.067)
0.304***
(0.104)
0.014**
(0.006)
-0.033***
(0.009)
0.146**
(0.062)
-0.098**
(0.043)
-0.002
(0.005)
0.023
(0.022)
-0.214*
(0.128)
-0.086
(0.134)
-0.089
(0.140)
-0.036
(0.139)
0.012
(0.147)
0.169
(0.146)
0.060
(0.119)
-0.312*
(0.159)
-0.320**
(0.133)
-0.326*
(0.168)
0.035
(0.150)
383
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(2)
Only RE
-0.168**
(0.085)
-0.269***
(0.036)
0.033
(0.046)
0.002*
(0.001)
0.049
(0.068)
0.180**
(0.075)
0.131**
(0.060)
0.271***
(0.090)
0.012**
(0.005)
-0.030***
(0.008)
0.149***
(0.055)
-0.088**
(0.037)
-0.005
(0.004)
0.023
(0.019)
-0.115
(0.116)
-0.061
(0.121)
-0.064
(0.127)
-0.004
(0.129)
0.027
(0.133)
0.124
(0.132)
0.090
(0.112)
-0.252*
(0.146)
-0.270**
(0.119)
-0.303**
(0.147)
0.023
(0.136)
383

The results are consistent with the hypothesis put forth in this chapter. The
variable of interest is negative and significant at the 10 percent level in Model 1. The
variable indicates that when the political price of renewable energy policymaking is low,
the sponsor is less likely to propose a bill that includes funding for decentralized
renewable energy provision. Specifically, having both a Democratic sponsor and majority
Democratic legislature decreases the probability of proposing funding for decentralized
renewable energy by about 20 percent, all else equal. The variable of interest is
significant at the five percent level in Model 2, which restricts the dependent variable to
count only those bills that have decentralized funding for renewable energy and no other
form of energy. In Model 2, low political price of renewable energy policymaking
decreases the probably of proposing funding for decentralized renewable energy by about
17 percent, all else equal.
Models 1 and 2 also suggest that other explanatory variables are significantly
correlated with the likelihood of proposing decentralized funding for renewable energy.
The results for centralized funding also offer support for the hypothesis. Centralized
funding, a dummy variable equal to 1 if the proposed bill includes funding for centralized
provision of renewable energy, is statistically significant in both models. However, the
direction of the impact is different between the two models. In Model 1, centralized
funding increases the probability of including a provision for funding for decentralized
provision of renewable energy. This could indicate that broader energy packages to fund
multiple forms of energy likely start with a comprehensive approach to funding
renewable energy development by also funding centralized renewable energy output.
Conversely, centralized funding is negative and significant in Model 2, which counts bills
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that propose funding only for renewable energy. This model offers further support for the
theory proposed in Chapter Four, suggesting that centralized funding and decentralized
funding for renewable energy could be substitutes. However, further investigation of the
causality between these two variables is warranted.
The three variables measuring legislators’ characteristics are significant in both
models. Chamber seniority is positive and significant at the five percent level in both
models. The coefficients are approximately one percent in both models, implying that
each additional term in the Chamber increases the likelihood of proposing decentralized
funding by one percent, all else qual. This result is consistent with expectations.
However, the result for committee seniority is not consistent with my initial expectations.
Committee seniority is significant at the one percent level and negative in both models.
The results suggest that each additional consecutive term on the House Energy
Committee reduces the likelihood of introducing a bill with funding for decentralized
renewable energy, all else equal. This could imply that more senior committee members
are more likely to propose centralized funding for renewable energy, although this result
also warrants further exploration.
Energy committee member is significant at and positive in both models. In both
models, being on the energy committee increases the probability of including a provision
for funding decentralized renewable energy provision by approximately 15 percent, all
else equal. This coefficient is significant at the five percent level in Model 1 and at the
one percent level in Model 2. This result could suggest that committee members are more
likely to include a provision for funding in general, regardless of whether the funding
supports centralized or decentralized provision of renewable energy. However, this result
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does not imply causation as there is likely endogeneity since legislators self-select into
committees.
Furthermore, the results in Table 5.5 show the statistical significance of
Democrats and the passage of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 in
the likelihood of including a provision for funding. Post 2008 and Democrats are
significant and positive in Models 1 and 2, suggesting that both are positively associated
with the probability of proposing funding for decentralized provision of renewable
energy. Furthermore, the interaction between these two variables is positive and
significant at the one percent level in both models. In Model 1, the probability of
including a provision for funding decentralized renewable energy increases by 30 percent
for Democratic sponsors who introduced a renewable energy bill after 2008, all else
equal.
Only one of the three state-level energy variables included in the models is
significant. The amount of renewable energy production per capita in legislator i’s state
in the previous year is significant at the 5 percent level in both models. Looking at Model
1, a one billion BTU increase in renewable energy production per capita in legislator i’s
state decreases the likelihood of proposing decentralized funding for renewable energy by
approximately 10 percent. However, the magnitude of this result indicates that state-level
renewable energy production does not have a substantive impact on the dependent
variable. To put this result in perspective, South Dakota, which has the highest renewable
energy production per capita, produced 0.26 billion BTUs per capita in 2016 (“Table
P5B” 2019).44 The amount of fossil fuel energy produced per capita in the sponsor’s state

44

This calculation is based on population estimates from the U.S. Census Bureau’s 2016 Population and
Housing Estimates.
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in the previous year and the amount of energy consumed per capita in the sponsor’s state
in the previous year are not significantly associated with the likelihood of including a
provision for funding decentralized renewable energy.
The two additional measures used to capture legislators’ preferences do not
significantly affect the probability of proposing funding for decentralized renewable
energy. Whether the proposed bill includes a provision for fossil fuel energy and the
proportion of bipartisan support are not statistically significant. The number of
cosponsors on the proposed bill was used as a proxy to capture potential agreements
between legislators to support projects. The coefficient is statistically significant, but the
effect size is essentially zero. This result indicates that it does not impact the probability
of the proposed bill including funding for decentralized renewable energy.

5.7 Robustness Checks
I refer to the theoretical model in Chapter Four to consider the robustness of the results in
Table 5.5. The model argues that political price varies by good. The chapter argues that a
high political price associated with centralized renewable energy provision explains why
legislators support decentralized renewable energy. I also argue that the price differences
between centralized and decentralized renewable energy provision, as defined in this
chapter, are unique to renewable energy. Therefore, I also consider the counterfactual as a
robustness check. If the variable of interest is key to understanding why renewable
energy remains decentralized, we should expect that the variable of interest does not
significantly explain funding proposals for the decentralization of other types of energy.
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I run two additional linear probability models. Models 3 and 4 test the variable of
interest on the likelihood of including a provision for funding decentralized energy
development for all types of energy other than renewable energy. The dependent variable
in both models is equal to 1 if bill contains a provision for decentralized funding for any
type of energy other than renewable energy, 0 otherwise. For example, the dependent
variable would be coded as 1 for a grant program for fossil fuel energy and coded as 0 for
a grant program for solar panels. Models 3 and 4 are identical except for the sample of
bills. The sample in Model 3 considers all energy bills including bills that discuss
renewable energy but do not provide decentralized funding for renewable energy. The
sample in Model 4 includes only bills that do not mention renewable energy. 45 Figure 5.2
shows the coefficients for low political price for both models.

45

There are 1,007 observations in Model 3 and 624 observations in Model 4.
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Figure 5.2
Robustness Check
The Effect of Low Political Price on the Likelihood of Proposing Funding for
Decentralized Provision of Non-Renewable Energy Sources

The variable of interest is negative but not statistically significant in Models 3 or
4. This implies that a low political price associated with renewable energy policymaking
do not significantly impact the decision to propose decentralized funding for nonrenewable energy sources. This robustness check further validates the findings in Models
1 and 2 by showing that the variable of interest does not explain decentralized funding for
other forms of energy. Instead, it suggests that renewable energy is a unique case of a
good with large spillovers that remains decentralized due to the policy climate
surrounding this issue.
Although the focus of this chapter is the decision to use decentralized funding, the
theoretical model in Chapter Four posits that legislators will choose centralized funding
for renewable energy when the political price of renewable energy policymaking is high.
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Therefore, I focus on centralized funding to further evaluate the robustness of the results
in Table 5.5. I consider the decision to propose funding for the centralized provision of
renewable energy compared to the decision to propose funding for the centralized
provision of other forms of energy.
I run another two linear probability models as robustness checks to evaluate the
effect of low political price on centralized funding decisions. The explanatory variables
in both models are identical, but the dependent variables and samples are different.
Model 5 looks at the decision to propose centralized funding for renewable energy, and
Model 6 looks at the decision to propose centralized funding for any form of energy other
than renewable energy. Therefore, the sample of bills used for Model 5 includes only
bills that contain a provision for renewable energy. The dependent variable in this model
is equal to 1 if the bill proposes centralized funding for renewable energy. For
comparison, the sample of bills used for Model 6 includes bills that contain no provision
for renewable energy.46 The dependent variable in this model is equal to 1 if the bill
includes a provision for centralizing funding for any type of energy other than renewable
energy.

46

There are 383 observations in Model 5 and 624 observations in Model 6.
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Figure 5.3
Robustness Check
The Effect of Low Political Price on the Likelihood of Proposing Funding for
Centralized Renewable Energy and Non-Renewable Energy

The variable of interest is significant and positive in Model 5, which is consistent
with the hypothesis. The result suggests that when the political price of renewable energy
policymaking is low, legislators are 17 percent more likely to introduce a bill with
funding for centralized renewable energy, all else equal. However, this finding is
significant only at the 10 percent level and warrants further investigation. Furthermore,
the variable of interest in Model 6, which considers non-renewable energy bills, is not
significant. This is also consistent with the hypothesis and the results, suggesting that the
relationship between policy climate and funding mechanism is unique to renewable
energy in the ways discussed through the chapters.
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5.8 Conclusions
This chapter seeks to empirically evaluate the theoretical model put forth in Chapter
Four. I estimate the likelihood of a legislator proposing funding for decentralized
renewable energy when the political price of renewable energy policymaking is low.
The results from the linear probability model support the hypothesis: when the political
price of renewable energy policymaking is low, a policy maker is less likely to use grants
to support decentralized renewable energy. The robustness checks offer additional
support for this hypothesis, suggesting that these results are specific to the unique case of
renewable energy output as we observe in the United States. Additionally, the robustness
checks offer weak support for the counterfactual: legislators are more likely to propose
funding for centralized renewable energy when the political price of centralized
renewable energy provision is low.
This chapter offers two main contributions to the existing literature. First, the
results offer another explanation as to why the decision to use grants for good provision
deviate from normative economic theory. Other scholars discuss the importance of
politics and institutional incentives in affecting whether a good will be centralized or
decentralized. I contribute to these studies by directly evaluating the role of political price
in affecting the decision to use grants for decentralized good provision. Second, the
results contribute to studies in energy policy. Whereas other energy studies focus on
subnational efforts to adopt renewable energy policies in response to a lack of federal
action, this study considers federal policymakers’ actions to support decentralized
renewable energy provision with grants.

99

While the results offer support for the hypothesis in this chapter, the findings are
limited by the data. This chapter takes a very direct approach to evaluate a legislator’s
initial decision by looking at renewable energy bills introduced in Congress. The analysis
uses the bills to infer legislators’ preferences. However, the analysis would benefit from
actual data on individual legislators, such as aggregated data on voting or survey data,
which does not currently exist. Additionally, the analysis could be further enhanced by
considering other actors involved in the policymaking process, including interest groups,
other legislators, and legislative staff. To the extent that these individuals impact policy
proposals put forth by individual legislators, the bills analyzed in this chapter might not
be an accurate representation of bill sponsors’ initial decisions.
The next chapter further investigates the theoretical model in Chapter Four by
evaluating the underlying assumptions of the hypotheses. I argue that funding for
decentralized renewable energy is the utility-maximizing choice when the political price
associated with centralized renewable energy policymaking is high. The model implies
that renewable energy output will increase in decentralized provision, even if this is not
the optimal type of provision according to normative economic theory. Chapter Six
evaluates this assumption by analyzing the effectiveness of renewable energy grants,
offering additional support for the theoretical model in Chapter Four and a deeper
understanding of the motivation to utilize renewable energy grants.
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CHAPTER SIX: AN EMPIRICAL EVALUATION OF ENERGY GRANTS
EFFECTIVENESS ON RENEWABLE ENERGY OUTPUT
6.1 Introduction
Like the previous chapter, this chapter empirically evaluates the theoretical model
proposed in Chapter Four to explain why legislators use renewable energy grants to
increase renewable energy output. The theoretical model is built on the assumption that a
legislator’s utility increases with either choice of funding mechanism, centralized or
decentralized, as he or she expects any amount of funding to increase output and the
probability of reelection. This chapter empirically examines whether decentralized funding
leads to an increase in goods with a normative argument for centralization. I focus on the
effect of energy grants on renewable energy production. Consistent with the theoretical
model in Chapter Four, I hypothesize that energy grants are associated with an increase in
renewable energy output at the local level.
As discussed in previous chapters, the literature does not provide unequivocal
support that grants increase output. Crowding out is one explanation, which occurs when
local governments substitute own spending for federal grant dollars. The fungibility of
funds can result in a small to no net effect on public investment. When funds are
completely fungible, own spending is completely substituted for federal grants. Studies
also find incomplete crowding out where every dollar in federal grant money leads to a
decrease in own spending of less than one dollar. Another explanation is directly linked
to energy grants. Scholars argue that renewable energy projects are associated with large,
positive externalities relating to air quality, reduced greenhouse gas emissions, energy
conservation, innovation, and public health. Therefore, normative arguments make the

101

case for centralized renewable energy, leading to the question as to whether renewable
energy grants are effective at increasing renewable energy output.
This chapter contributes to an understudied area of research. Generally, studies on
the effectiveness of renewable energy grants are not feasible as spending on renewable
energy grants is either not reported or not consistently reported. This study uses a unique
public dataset on one-time energy project grants awarded through the American
Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA). The §1603 energy grant program was
one component of a total energy package focusing expanding clean energy, offering cash
payments for wind, residential and nonresidential solar, biomass, geothermal, and other
types of renewable energy (“Overview and Status Update,” 2017). The program sought to
increase renewable energy generation in addition to increase energy efficiency and
improve transportation (“American Recovery and Reinvestment Act Program Plan,”
2009). The U.S. Department of Energy’s Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable
Energy was responsible for the funding announcement and reviewing project
applications. With the implementation of ARRA, the Office expanded its current formula
grant program and distributed additional competitive awards.
The U.S. Department of the Treasury had primary responsibility of administering
the §1603 grant program, including administering funds to subnational governments and
entities, such as states, counties, cities, public nonprofits, small businesses. The Treasury
department was also responsible for reporting requirements for selected projects. This
program is conducive to empirical evaluation as it required reporting on ARRA award
recipients, including whether each grant was awarded for renewable energy or other types
of energy projects, the amount awarded, the amount distributed, and where the project
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was located. Furthermore, the program required recipients to have a detailed project plan
and to periodically report on the project’s status to ensure that funds were spent to
increase the amount of installed renewable energy capacity.
As of March 2017, the grant program awarded $25.7 billion to fund 105,972
renewable energy projects, which accounted for about 22% of total project investments.
Table 6.1 compares the total amount of §1603 grants awarded for renewable energy by
energy type as of March 2017. The table also shows the total number of projects and
expected generation capacity. Approximately $13 billion was awarded to 1,026 wind
projects, which received the most total funding and had the highest expected generation
capacity of 21,633 megawatts. Residential and nonresidential solar accounted for the
largest number of projects with a combined total award amount of approximately $9.8
billion. All solar investments were expected to have 9,428 megawatts in generation
capacity.
Table 6.1
Total Awards by Renewable Energy Type
Renewable Energy
Total Awards
Number of
Generation Capacity
Type
(millions)
Projects
(megawatts)
Wind
$12,995
1,026
21,633
Non-Residential Solar
$8,928
19,889
8,976
Residential Solar
$890
84,162
462
Biomass
$1,053
168
1,334
Geothermal
$764
163
758
Other
$1,091
564
1,314
Source: U.S. Department of the Treasury, (“Overview and Status Update,” 2017)

Most studies evaluate grant effectiveness by estimating the impact of grants on
public spending. Although ARRA required reporting on the grant amount awarded, it is
not clear how much entities spent on renewable energy prior to receiving an ARRA grant.
Additionally, ARRA awards were awarded to several types of entities, making it difficult
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to track spending on renewable energy. Therefore, I evaluate the effectiveness of
renewable energy grants by directly measuring renewable energy output, net renewable
energy generation. Energy scholars who study policy effectiveness utilize net renewable
energy generation as a measure of policy effectiveness (e.g. Carley, 2009). However, to
my knowledge, no studies focus on renewable energy grant effectiveness at the local
level in the U.S.
The following section reviews the literature on grant effectiveness, focusing on
issues of crowding out and endogeneity. I hypothesize that receiving a grant leads to an
increase in renewable energy production at the local level. To test the effects of energy
grants on energy production, I utilize data on ARRA §1603 grants awarded in 2009 and
2010 from the U.S. Department of Energy. I match this data with energy production data
from the U.S. Energy Information Administration from 2005 to 2014 for counties that
had an operational power plant over this period. I consider the impact on all types of
renewable energy but focus on solar energy as the majority of ARRA awards in the
dataset were awarded for solar energy projects. 47 I aggregate all ARRA award and energy
production measures at the county-level to create consistent measures. I run a fixed
effects model, accounting for changes in economic activity during the recession of 2007
to 2009 on the estimated impacts of energy grants. I find that counties with an ARRA
grant recipient had a significant and positive increase in solar energy production. I also
include robustness checks to consider unobserved preferences and regional initiatives.

47

The data include only awards that were recorded for 2009 or 2010 at the time of data collection. The
data do not include awards distributed after the data were collected.
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The additional empirical evaluation suggests that ARRA grants are most effective in
warmer climate regions but are not affected by regional initiatives.
The research question put forth in this chapter is relevant for several reasons. This
approach offers a different perspective on understanding grant effectiveness, because it
considers how dollars are spent instead of the amount spent. In other words, I measure
the actual good produced instead of the change in local spending on the good. This is an
interesting perspective as the amount of dollars spent on renewable energy may not be
perfectly correlated with the actual amount of renewable energy produced from grantfunded projects. Additionally, the analysis helps further our understanding of a
legislator’s motivation to support renewable energy grants. If renewable energy grants
increase renewable energy output, we can be more confident that the model proposed in
Chapter Four describes a legislator’s utility function since it implies that renewable
energy output increases regardless of funding mechanism.

6.2 Effectiveness of Fiscal Transfers
Grants are commonly designed to correct inefficiencies in decentralized policymaking by
increasing spending on the local public good (e.g. Oates, 1972; 1991; 1999). However,
intergovernmental transfers are fungible (Bradford and Oates 1971a, b). Fungibility refers
to the ability of grant recipients to substitute state and local funds for federal funds, such
as reducing taxes or own spending in response to receiving a federal grant. In other
words, federal grants can crowd out local spending, resulting in no net or diminished
effect on public spending. For example, complete crowding out would result in a dollarfor-dollar crowd out, resulting in no net effect on public spending. Partial crowd out
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occurs when one dollar in federal grant results in a reduction of local spending of less
than one dollar.
Some of the first studies on grant effectiveness find that fiscal transfers increase
public spending (Gramlich, 1977; Inman, 1979; Fisher, 1982; Hines and Thaler, 1995). 48
As explained in previous chapters, this effect, referred to as the flypaper effect, occurs
when grants lead to a greater level of spending on the public good than an equivalent
increase in citizen income. Chubb (1985) argues that economic models could not provide
a complete explanation of the subnational fiscal decisions using federal grant money,
because politics, including ideological and constituency-oriented demands, also play a
role. In fact, Inman (2008) argues that the political process is the best explanation for the
flypaper effect. Mainly, legislators desire to send funds to their constituents for benefits
such as reelection and political gains (e.g. Weingast, 2009; Inman, 1989; Grossman,
1994; Rodden, 2003; Gamkhar and Ali, 2008). However, Allers and Vermeulen (2016)
argue that rent-seeking did not explain the flypaper effect in their study of local spending
in the Netherlands, because grants were fully capitalized in housing prices. Instead, they
offer government corruption as an explanation for the flypaper effect.
Empirical analyses on grant effectiveness test whether the flypaper effect is due to
the endogenous nature of grants since unobserved preferences are not included in the
model. Knight (2002) explains that preferences can influence grant distribution and
spending on public output. Therefore, grants are likely awarded to localities that have
stronger preferences for the public good. Some studies use political factors as instruments

48

Some early studies find no effect on public spending (Hamilton, 1983; Hamilton, 1986).
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to control for endogeneity. Gamkhar and Oates (1996) instrument grants using the
proportion of Democrats in Congress and find evidence of crowding in, although results
from specification tests are mixed. In other words, they find that federal grants increase
subnational public investments. Knight (2002) controls for endogeneity by using
legislative committee representation as instruments to control for unobserved preferences
and finds evidence that federal highway grants crowd out state spending.
Other studies exploit the grant formula to control for endogeneity. Gordon (2004)
uses an unanticipated change in the Title I grant formula to address endogeneity and finds
a delayed effect of Title I grants on state and local education spending, but the effect
diminishes over time. Dahlby and Ferede (2016) test Hamilton’s (1986) theory that the
flypaper effect arises from distortionary taxes imposed by subnational governments. They
exploit the discontinuity of a grant formula used to distribute fiscal transfers to Canadian
provinces and find support for this theory, attributing the flypaper effect to the
deadweight loss of distortionary taxes. They argue that federal grants stimulate marginal
expenditures by subnational governments, increasing the marginal costs of spending.
Moreover, Dahlberg and Edmark (2008) use a discontinuity in a Swedish grant system
where only municipalities above a certain migration rate receive extra grants, finding an
increase in local spending and no reduction in local taxes.
Scholars also use unanticipated court decisions to control for endogeneity in
studies on grant effectiveness. Lutz (2010) studies the effects of a court decision to
change how lump sum education grants were awarded from the state to municipalities,
finding that grants crowd out local spending. Card and Payne (2002) study school finance
reform by looking at looking at changes in funding decisions required by the Supreme
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Court. They find evidence of the flypaper effect, where state grant aid increases spending
by local school districts.
Leduc and Wilson (2017) suggest that studying the effectiveness of ARRA
highway grants might address issues of endogeneity and crowding out that arise with
other studies on grant effectiveness. They instrument highway grants using proposed
highway miles and find an increase in state spending. However, they argue for the
exogenous treatment of ARRA grants since they were an unanticipated increase in
spending. Furthermore, they explain that ARRA included a “maintenance-of-effort”
requirement for highway grants to prevent crowding out state spending. The requirement
directed states to maintain their planned level of transportation spending while receiving
additional ARRA grant money for transportation. However, it is not clear if states
complied with the requirement.

6.3 ARRA Grants
The Federal Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 was a federal stimulus bill in
response to the economic downtown of 2007 to 2009. The stimulus package contained
provisions for several grant programs, including energy grants. Aldy (2013) argues that
the stimulus bill, which contained funding for both federal and decentralized funding for
renewable energy, was a means by which the Obama administration carried out its clean
energy policy goals. Aldy explains that the Office of Energy and Climate Change was
charged with drafting the clean energy package and told Congress to prioritize promoting
renewable energy power, among other things. 49 U.S. Senator Harry Reid introduced S.1

49

The Office of Energy and Climate Change, a temporary office, is currently closed.
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on January 6, 2009, and H.R.1 (the House-amended version) was introduced shortly after
President Obama’s inauguration on January 26, 2009. Both bills contained a clean energy
package, allocating most clean energy expenditures to renewable energy. The final draft,
adopted on February 17, 2009, included many initial recommendations.
ARRA’s §1603 grant program required expeditious installation of energy
projects. The U.S. Department of the Treasury, who was responsible for administering
the program, required applicants to submit a detailed project plan that included a
construction permit and proof that projected costs matched the amount requested in the
grant application (“§1603 Program,” n.d.). The program also required ongoing progress
reports to ensure that recipients continued to meet program deadlines. ARRA-funded
projects were to start construction by the end of 2010 and become operational no later
than 2012 for wind farms; 2013 for biomass, landfill gas, and marine energy projects; and
2016 for solar, geothermal and fuel cell projects (Martin et al., 2009). However, scholars
report that ARRA-funded projects in general were associated with up to one-year delays
in implementation (Callahan et al., 2012; Terman et al., 2012; Terman and Feiock, 2012).
Scholars exploit ARRA’s reporting requirements to study the effectiveness of
other ARRA grant programs on public spending. Studies find evidence of crowding-out
of state borrowing for infrastructure (Cogan and Taylor, 2011; Inman, 2010). However,
Leduc and Wilson (2017) study highway grants during the 2009 Recovery Act to ask how
states responded to sudden, large changes in federal funding. After controlling for
endogeneity, they conclude that grants were exogenous, finding that federal grants
increase own spending. Studies also find evidence of rent-seeking. Leduc and Wilson
find that states with higher political contributions from the public-works sector spent
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more ARRA funds. Furthermore, Young and Sobel (2013) look at ARRA spending in
general and find that states previously capturing large amounts of federal funds continue
to do so under ARRA stimulus. However, these studies consider the impact on spending
but not the good itself, as considered in this analysis.
Although no study to my knowledge empirically evaluates ARRA energy grants
at the local level, few studies offer insights on ARRA energy grants. Bollinger et al.
(2010) suggest that ARRA grants might have motivated wind investment but discuss
concerns of possible endogeneity as wind grants were awarded to developers who had a
history of wind purchases. However, Terman and Feiock (2014) argue that selection bias
might not be an issue because very few grants applications were rejected, suggesting that
grants were not just awarded to applicants with the highest preferences for renewable
energy. Part of the difficultly in considering the role of preferences is that there is no
consistent measure across types of entities who received an ARRA energy grants. ARRA
energy grants were awarded to local governments and various forms of entities within
these governments, making it difficult to find a single measure of preferences to control
for potential endogeneity.
Finally, some scholars discuss implementation issues associated with ARRA that
might impact how grant effectiveness is measured. For example, Terman and Feiock
(2014) look at the implementation timeline of energy projects funded by ARRA energy
grants and find that the level of direct involvement from city officials affects whether a
project would be implemented on time. Other studies consider other types of ARRA
grants. Leduc and Wilson (2013) explain that highway projects could be delayed due to
timing of outlays to grant recipients as some outlays occur after project completion.
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Gamkhar (2000) studies effectiveness of highway grants and finds no immediate effect
but does find a delayed increase in state and local spending in response to federal
highway grants.

6.4 Data
I compile data from several sources to test whether renewable energy grants increase
renewable energy production at the local level. The dependent variables are net
renewable energy generation in megawatt hours (MWH) by energy type. Data are from
the U.S. Energy Information Administration’s EIA 923 (previously the EIA-906/920)
form, which provides the amount of energy produced by individual power plants across
the U.S. (“Electricity,” 2017). Net generation is the amount of energy produced in
megawatt hours by a power plant minus the amount of energy consumed in megawatt
hours by the power plant during the energy production process. 50 I use four measures of
net renewable energy generation: total renewable energy, solar, wind, and biomass. Total
renewable energy net generation includes renewable energy from all renewable energy
sources. Solar energy includes photovoltaics and thermal solar energy. I aggregate power
plant data at the county level for years 2005 to 2014, which includes years before and
after the distribution of ARRA grants.
Some counties have multiple power plants, most of which produce more than one
type of energy.51 I calculated the total amount of energy produced by power plants by

50

While the grants were designed to increase generation capacity, net generation more accurately
measures an increase in renewable energy production.
51
While I cannot match each power plant with the project funded by an ARRA energy grant, I assume that
grant recipients produce renewable energy through existing renewable energy power plants within the
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each type of energy for each county in the dataset. For example, the total net generation
of solar energy produced for each year in each county is the total amount of solar energy
produced by all power plants within that county in that same year. Data on power plant
energy production are included for 7,768 power plants in 2,117 counties, although not all
2,117 counties produced power or for each type of energy in each year in the analysis.
Table 6.2 shows the number of power plants and counties in the dataset that produced
each type of energy in any year from 2005 to 2014. Hydroelectric and biomass energy are
produced in a larger number of counties compared to other types of renewable energy.
Wind and solar energy are produced by a larger number of plants other than
hydroelectricity compared to other forms of renewable energy.
Table 6.2
Number of Power Plants and Energy-Producing Counties by Fuel Type
Number of Power
Number of
Fuel Type
Plants
Counties
Solar PV and thermal
992
270
Geothermal
67
19
Hydroelectric Pumped Storage or
1,493
595
Conventional
Wind
895
346
Biogenic Municipal Solid Waste and
847
567
Landfill Gas and Wood and Wood Waste
Other Renewables
262
202
Nonrenewable Sources
3,962
1,683
Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration EIA 923 form
Note: Although biogenic municipal solid waste and wood and wood waste are listed as separate categories,
both are biomass energy.

Table 6.3 shows summary statistics for dependent variables used in the analysis.
The table includes the average values for the beginning and ending years in the dataset,
which include years before and after the distribution of ARRA energy grants. The table

same county. Renewable energy is localized since energy production efficiency is diminished with
distance.
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shows the average values for total net generation aggregated at the county level. 52 The
average amount of net generation for all forms of renewable energy increased from 2006
to 2014, while the average amount of nonrenewable net energy production decreased. Net
renewable energy generation increased by 28.8 percent, on average. The largest
percentage increase was for net solar energy generation, which increased by 3,081
percent. Energy from nonrenewable sources declined by 11.3 percent from 2006 to 2014,
on average.
Table 6.3
Summary Statistics
Net Energy Generation in Megawatt Hours Aggregated by County
2006 and 2014
Variable
Renewable Energy Net Generation
Solar Net Generation
Wind Net Generation
Biomass Net Generation
Nonrenewable Energy Net Generation

2006 Mean
222,132
297
15,577
30,984
2,158,903

2014 Mean
286,141
9,449
97,526
32,656
1,914,315

% Change
28.8%
3,081%
526.1%
5.4%
-11.3%

Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration EIA 923 form

The variable of interest in this analysis is ARRA energy grants. I use data on
Section §1603 ARRA grants awarded in years 2009 and 2010 downloaded from the U.S.
Department of Energy’s website (“Recovery Act Recipient Data,” 2017). I include
awards only for renewable energy projects. Each observation in the dataset lists the
recipient, the city in which the project was located, the amount awarded, and the date
awarded. Award recipients included counties, cities, universities, tribes, nonprofits,
schools, companies, and states. To design a feasible study, I use the project’s location, the
county in which the project was located, as the unit of analysis. In some cases, the county

52

Negative net energy generation occurs when the energy consumed in the energy production process
exceeds the amount of energy produced.
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of the project’s location was evident by the name of the recipient. In other cases, I
conducted a Google search to determine in which county the project was located.
I use the data to create two measures of ARRA grants. The first is designed as a
treatment variable, equal to 1 if a county had an ARRA grant recipient in year t and every
subsequent year. Therefore, this variable is equal to 1 starting in 2009 or in 2010 for each
county in the sample that had an ARRA grant recipient. 53 I also include a secondary
measure to account for the magnitude of ARRA energy grants. Since renewable energy
project costs can vary considerably, I count the number of ARRA energy grants received
in a county instead of the total dollar amount of ARRA energy awards. This variable is
the cumulative number of ARRA awards received by recipients in a county in the current
and previous years. Therefore, this variable is equal to 0 for all counties until year 2009.
Table 6.4 shows the aggregated amount of ARRA renewable energy grant awards
by county. Approximately nine percent of counties had an ARRA renewable energy grant
recipient. Counties in the dataset had anywhere from one to 49 ARRA renewable energy
grant recipients over years 2009 and 2010, although most counties had only one ARRA
grant recipient. Of counties that had an ARRA recipient, 230 counties had only one
recipient, and two counties had the maximum number of recipients. Two counties had the
second highest number of recipients at 10 ARRA grant recipients for each county.
Counties received an average of $547,617 in ARRA grant awards, which includes
counties that did not receive an ARRA award for renewable energy. Of counties that

53

For a county that had an ARRA grant recipient in 2009 and 2010, this variable is coded as 1 in 2009 and
every subsequent year. There is no change to account for the 2010 recipient(s) in this case.
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received an award, the average amount awarded to recipients was $8,088,057, and the
minimum was $4,941.
Table 6.4
Summary Statistics
ARRA Renewable Energy Grants Awarded to Recipients Aggregated by County
2009 and 2010
Variable
County with an ARRA Award Recipient
ARRA Award Count by County
Total ARRA Award Amount by County

Mean
0.09
0.18
$547,617

Min
0
0
$0

Max
1
49
$1,980,000

Source: U.S. Department of Energy

Figure 6.1 shows the geographic distribution of ARRA renewable energy grant
recipients in the dataset. The graph shows counties that had a renewable energy project
funded by ARRA §1603 grants in 2009 or 2010 and had at least one power plant
producing renewable energy by the end of 2014. There are 161 counties included in the
dataset that received an ARRA grant and had at least one renewable energy power plant
during this period. As the figure shows, counties meeting these criteria are dispersed
throughout the United States.
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Figure 6.1
ARRA Renewable Energy Grant Recipients
in Counties with Renewable Energy Production
2005 to 2014

Sources: U.S. Department of Energy; U.S. Energy Information Administration

The largest proportion of ARRA grants in the dataset were awarded for residential
and nonresidential solar energy projects. Figure 6.2 shows the 260 counties in the United
States that had a solar power plant over the time period observed in this analysis. Figure
6.3 shows which of these counties also had a renewable energy project funded by an
ARRA energy grant. The figures show that ARRA awards were distributed throughout
the regions across the United States with solar-producing counties. All solar-producing
regions across the United States have both counties that received an ARRA grant and
counties that did not receive an ARRA grant.
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Figure 6.2
Counties with a Solar Power Plant
2005 to 2014

Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration

Figure 6.3
Counties with a Solar Power Plant and
a Renewable Energy ARRA Grant Recipient
2009 or 2010

Sources: U.S. Department of Energy; U.S. Energy Information Administration

Wind and biomass were the next common types of ARRA energy grants awarded.
Although not shown here, the dataset has 337 counties that produced wind energy over
the observed time period, and 20 of those counties received an ARRA energy grant. The
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sample includes 481 counties that produced biomass energy, and 73 of those counties
received an ARRA grant.
I also include county-level controls from the literature that are expected to impact
investments in renewable energy production. The literature includes economic controls,
which can influence a locality’s ability to make public investments (Winer, 1983;
Ghamkar and Oates, 1996; Dahlby and Ferede, 2016; Leduc and Wilson, 2017). I assume
that these same economic factors affect an area’s likelihood of investing in renewable
energy infrastructure. I include income and unemployment in the model. Personal income
per capita data are from the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis’ Regional Economic
Accounts and are adjusted for inflation using 2014 dollars. The unemployment rate is
from U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistic’s Local Area Unemployment Statistics. I expect
income to be positively related to renewable energy production, as higher income might
signal greater ability to make public investments. Additionally, income could indicate
preferences for intergovernmental grants as counties with less income might be more
likely to apply for grant programs. I expect unemployment to be negatively associated
with renewable energy development if unemployment is a signal of a restricted ability to
make public investments.
I also include variables that are expected to impact demand for renewable energy
investments and production. I include a measure of population density to control for
amount of renewable energy used. I use population data from the U.S. Bureau of
Economic Analysis’ Regional Economic Accounts and land area data from the US
Census Bureau’s TIGER files and Census of Population and Housing. Geographic factors
are also expected to affect the amount and types of renewable energy investments since
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renewable energy resources are directly tied to location. I include the maximum
temperature in July to control for disproportionate changes in temperature changes across
the United States (Egan and Mullins, 2017). This could affect both renewable energy
resources and renewable energy consumption. The values are based on average
temperatures across weather stations within each county.
I also control for state-level policy actions that could affect the implementation of
local energy projects. There are two state-level controls in the model. The first is the
amount of renewable energy production produced in the state in which the county is
located, which was collected from the U.S. Energy Information Administration’s State
Energy Data System. I expect this variable to be positively associated with local
renewable energy production, since higher levels of state renewable energy production
likely indicate more developed energy infrastructure. The second is a dummy variable
equal to 1 if a state has adopted a Renewable Portfolio Standard or goal to produce a
certain level of renewable energy collected from the National Conference of State
Legislatures (“State Renewable Portfolio Standards,” 2019). Renewable portfolio
standards have been found to increase total state renewable energy generation (Carley,
2009; Kydes, 2007). I expect this variable to be positively associated with local
renewable energy production as this variable indicates efforts to develop renewable
energy within each state.
Finally, I include controls to measure preferences for renewable energy
production. Fossil fuel energy net generation, collected from the U.S. Energy Information
Administration 923 form, is included to account for energy preferences that might be
opposed to expanding renewable energy. Since fossil fuel energy is often viewed as a
119

substitute to renewable energy, I expect fossil fuel production to be negatively associated
with renewable energy production. I also include county fixed effects to control for
unobserved preferences that are not captured by the control variables in the model. Year
dummy variables are included to control for additional macroeconomic factors that are
not addressed by the local economic variables included in the model. Table 6.3 provides a
description of how each variable is measured. Summary statistics are reported in
Appendix C.
Table 6.5
Variable Descriptions
Variable

Description

Solar Energy
Production
Wind Energy
Production
Biomass Energy
Production
RE Production

Total net generation in hundreds of megawatt hours from solar energy sources
produced from power plants within county i in year t.
Total net generation in hundreds of megawatt hours from wind energy sources
produced from power plants within county i in year t.
Total net generation in hundreds of megawatt hours from biomass energy sources
produced from power plants within county i in year t.
Total net generation in hundreds of megawatt hours from all renewable energy
sources produced from power plants within county i in year t.
Total net generation in hundreds of megawatt hours from all nonrenewable energy
sources produced from power plants within county i in year t.
Equal to 1 if a recipient within a county received an ARRA grant for renewable
energy in county i, 0 otherwise. This variable is equal to 1 the year the award was
received and each subsequent year.
The cumulative number of total amount of ARRA grant awarded for a renewable
energy project to all recipients in county i in 2009 to 2010.
The percentage of persons in the labor force who are unemployed in county i in
year t.
The natural log of inflation-adjusted personal income per capita in county i in year
t.
The maximum temperature recorded in January in county i in year t.
Total persons per square mile of land area in county i in year t.
Equal to 1 if county i’s state had a renewable portfolio standard or a renewable
energy goal in year t.
Total renewable energy production, measured in 10 billion BTUs, in county i’s
state in year t.

FF Energy
Production
ARRA Grant
ARRA Grants
Number
Unemployment
Income Per Cap
July Max Temp
Population
RPS or RPS goal
State RE Production
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6.5 Statistical Model and Methods
I observe a sample of energy-producing counties from 2005 to 2014, although some
variables are not observed across all years. I run a panel data model with county fixed
and year effects. A portion of the counties in the sample received an ARRA Section
§1603 grant in either 2009 or 2010. Since I have a portion of counties who received a
one-time ARRA grant and a control group of counties that did not receive a one-time
ARRA grant, the variable of interest is designed as a treatment variable. ARRA grant is
equal to 1 in the year in which a recipient in a county received an ARRA renewable
energy grant and 1 for all subsequent years. The variable measures the potential intercept
shift in renewable energy production for counties receiving a grant. Additionally, ARRA
grants number measures the cumulative number of grants received by a recipient in a
county as of time t.
The standard panel data model with fixed and year effects is shown in Model (1).
𝑌 = 𝑋 𝛽+ 𝛼 + 𝛿 + 𝜀

(1)

where 𝑌 is the dependent variable for county i in time t, 𝑋 is a matrix of control
variables for county i in time t, 𝛼 denotes the fixed effects for county i, 𝛿 is a vector of
year effects in time t, and 𝜀 is the error term. The fixed effects control for unobserved,
time-invariant effects that are unique to individual counties. The year effects control for
macroeconomic effects that are expected to have an impact on all counties across time t.
I consider potential endogeneity. Research in grant effectiveness warrants concern
for endogeneity due to unobserved preferences. Scholars argue on whether endogeneity is
a concern for ARRA grants. Leduc and Wilson (2017) find evidence in support of their
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hypothesis that grants were an exogenous shock in their analysis of state highway grants.
Terman and Feiock (2014) argue that selection bias might not be a problem because few
applications were rejected. However, other aspects of the program warrant concern for
endogeneity. Applications were reviewed by third parties, but most applicants were
aware of the application process before applying (Bollinger et al., 2010). Therefore, it is
plausible that grant recipients were those who had the strongest preferences for renewable
energy and the most skilled, which causes concern for biased results.
Methods used in the literature to control for endogeneity are not applicable in this
analysis due to the design of ARRA energy grants. One common method to control for
endogeneity is to utilize the grant distribution formula as an instrument (e.g. Gordon,
2004; Dahlberg et al., 2008; Leduc and Wilson, 2017). However, ARRA grants for
renewable energy investments were project grants that were awarded by a competitive
application process, not by a formula. Other scholars use political variables as
instruments. Gamkhar and Oates (1996) use the percentage of Democrats in Congress
along with population and unemployment to control for endogeneity associated with state
and local grants, and Knight (2002) uses the proportion of state representatives on
committees as instruments as he argues that congressional power influences grant
distribution. However, I am unable to find an appropriate political measure for the
different types of governmental entities and organizations in the analysis, especially since
all data are aggregated at the county level across time.
Instead, I argue that the county-level fixed effects to control for at least some
unobserved preferences that could affect grant distribution and the amount of renewable
energy produced in an area. The fixed effects are expected to capture at least some
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political preferences associated with renewable energy development. The fixed effects
will also likely control for some preferences associated with preferences for renewable
energy grants. While fixed effects are not the preferred approach to address unobserved
preferences, this is the only feasible way to address this concern given the nature of the
data. Additionally, the nature of this program mitigates some potential for bias as the
program was unanticipated and led to a sudden increase in spending. Furthermore,
Terman and Feiock’s (2014) argument that very few projects were rejected suggests that
project grants were not awarded to recipients who had the highest preferences for
renewable energy.
I consider two modifications to the model. First, I consider the economic
conditions during the time of ARRA. Whereas other studies look at the effectiveness of
ARRA grants from the period directly preceding the recession to the period directly
following the distribution of ARRA grants (e.g. Leduc and Wilson, 2017), I start with
years before the economic recession of 2007 to 2009 as I assume that renewable energy
production and investments could have decreased during the recession (e.g. Card and
Krueger, 2000). This concept, known as the Ashenfelter Dip, recognizes that there is
typically a dip in a program’s output right before a new program is implemented
(Ashenfelter, 1978; Ashenfelter and Card, 1985; Card and Krueger). In other words, we
should expect an increase in renewable energy production immediately following an
economic recession if energy production decreased during the economic recession. In this
case, the estimated impact of grants would be biased as it would measure a return to
steady-state energy production. Figure 6.4 shows the sum of total net generation of
renewable energy for counties across time. The figure shows a dip right before the
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economic recession. I assume that the dip at the start of the economic recession does not
reflect steady-state energy production. To account for the dip, I replace data values for all
energy and economic variables in years 2007 and 2008 with values from 2005 and 2006
in some of the following models.
Figure 6.4
Total Net Generation of Renewable Energy for All Energy Producing Counties
2005 to 2014

Second, I consider the differences in the time of award announcements and the
time it took for project implementation and completion. Although grants can have an
immediate effect on local spending, it is less likely that grants have an immediate effect
on renewable energy production since projects require time for completion. I assume a
delay in time from grant receipt to the time it takes for new energy projects to be
constructed. Figure 2 shows project completion deadlines as required by the §1603 grant
program. All renewable energy grants were awarded in years 2009 and 2010, although
not all were necessarily paid in those two years. Project deadlines ranged from 2012 to
2016, depending on energy type. For example, a recipient could have received a grant for
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a wind energy project in 2009 and have completed the project anywhere from 2009 to
2012. Even with reported one-year delays, all projects should have been completed by the
end of 2016 for grants awarded in 2009 or 2010. I run additional models to include a
series of lags for both ARRA grant variables, which also addresses the concerns for
project delays as discussed in the literature.
Figure 6.5
Timeline of Award Receipt and Deadline for Project Completion
Project Completion
Type of Energy Project

Award

Wind
Biomass
Landfill gas
Marine
Fuel Cells
Geothermal
Solar
2008

2009

2010

2011

2012
Year

2013

2014

2015

2016

Source: Martin et al. (2009)

I run four preliminary models without controlling for the potential pre-recession
dip or including any lags for ARRA grants. The variable of interest in each model is
ARRA grant, equal to 1 in the year in which a county had a recipient who received an
ARRA grant and for all subsequent years, 0 otherwise. The dependent variable in the first
model is total renewable energy net generation (MWH) at the county level. This
dependent variable includes renewable energy from all renewable sources, including
renewable energy sources not considered in this chapter. The dependent variables in the
second through fourth models include renewable energy net generation separately for
solar, wind, and biomass energy. Figure 6.6 shows the coefficients for ARRA grant for
each of the four preliminary models.
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Figure 6.6
Preliminary Fixed Effects Estimator for the Effect of ARRA Grants on
Renewable Energy Net Generation by Type of Energy
2007 to 2014

The preliminary coefficients for ARRA grants show different relationships
between ARRA grants and renewable energy production across the four models, which
measure renewable energy differently. The model for all renewable energy shows that
ARRA renewable energy grants are negatively and significantly related to total
renewable energy net generation. This effect could be at least partially driven by the
association between wind energy and ARRA grants as by the negative coefficient in the
wind energy model. The coefficients are significant and positive in the models for solar
energy and biomass energy. Before proceeding to the final models, I further investigate
the positive impacts relationship between ARRA grants and these two types of energy by
considering the potential for overstated energy production following the economic
126

recession. I run the same four preliminary models with years 2008 and 2009 replaced
with values from 2005 and 2006 for all energy and economic variables. The coefficients
are in Figure 6.7.
Figure 6.7
Preliminary Fixed Effects Estimator for the Effect of ARRA Grants on
Renewable Energy Net Generation by Type of Energy
Controlling for Economic Impacts
2007 to 2014

The figure above shows that solar energy production became less positive and
biomass energy became more positive after accounting for the possible dip in energy
production during the economic recession. Based on the preliminary results, I account for
the economic dip in the solar energy production models in the following section.
I also consider the negative effect for wind energy by comparing the counties that
received an ARRA grant to those that did not receive an ARRA grant. The following
three figures show these differences for solar, wind, and biomass energy separately.
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Figure 6.8 shows total solar energy net generation for grant recipients compared to
counties that did not receive a grant. The figure compares total net generation for the two
groups. The figure shows a greater level of total solar energy production for counties that
did not receive an ARRA grant since the majority of solar producing counties did not
have an ARRA grant recipient. The figure also shows that total solar energy production
increased for counties with recipients in almost all years except from 2005 to 2006 and
again from 2008 to 2009, on average. Total solar energy production increased for both
groups in 2009, which is the first year of the ARRA awards.
Figure 6.8
Total Solar Energy Net Generation
2005 to 2010

Figure 6.9 compares wind net generation in counties receiving an ARRA
renewable energy grant to counties not receiving an ARRA renewable energy grant over
the time period in the analysis. The two groups have different levels of total renewable
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energy production and vary differently across time leading up to ARRA awards. Total
wind net generation for the group not receiving ARRA grants increased from
approximately 20 million MWH to over 170 million MWH from 2005 to 2014 at a
relatively steady rate. A closer look at the group receiving ARRA grants shows that wind
energy generation increased over time, but there was more variation in yearly changes in
wind energy production for this group. Figure 6.10 compares the two groups for counties
producing biomass energy and shows a similar pattern. The group not receiving an
ARRA renewable energy grant produced over 40 million MWH of biomass energy
during this period, and the group receiving ARRA renewable energy grants remained
under 10 million MWH.
Figure 6.9
Wind Energy Net Generation
2005 to 2010
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Figure 6.10
Biomass Net Generation
2005 to 2010

The graphs show differences between counties receiving ARRA renewable
energy grants and counties not receiving ARRA renewable energy grants across counties
producing these three types of renewable energy. One plausible explanation as is that the
two groups in each graph are fundamentally different. It appears that ARRA grants were
targeted towards counties with underdeveloped renewable energy systems since growth
in renewable energy is different across time for the two groups. This provides further
justification for running a panel data model to test the change in energy production using
the ARRA grant variable as defined. I continue with using only solar energy production
in subsequent models for two reasons. First, ARRA grants for biomass and wind energy
were awarded less frequently than awards for solar energy. Second, I further investigate
the positive and significant finding of ARRA grants for solar energy production in the
preliminary model to check the validity of this finding.
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6.6 Results
I run four panel data models with years 2007 and 2008 replaced with values from 2005
and 2006 for all energy and economic variables. Therefore, the sample now includes
years 2007 to 2014 with the modified values for years 2007 and 2008. The results are
reported in Table 6.6. The dependent variable in each model is total solar energy net
generation (MWH) by county.54 In Model 1, the variable of interest, ARRA grant, is
equal to 1 for the year in which a county had an ARRA grant recipient and for all
subsequent years. It is equal to 0 in all years for counties that did have an ARRA grant
recipient over the time period in the analysis. ARRA grant is lagged by one year in
Model 2, by two years in Model 3, and by three years in Model 4. The lags are included
to test for any delays in project implementation or project completion following receipt of
an ARRA renewable energy grant. All models include fixed and year effects.

54

I also used the amount of the ARRA grant as the variable of interest, but the results are not included in
this dissertation. The amount of the ARRA grant was not significantly correlated with solar energy
production in any model. This result is likely best explained by the cost differences across projects,
especially since costs for renewable energy projects can vary considerably. Put differently, ARRA energy
grants were awarded based on percentage of cost. Therefore, a dollar spent on one project likely had a
different impact than a dollar spent on another project

131

Table 6.6
Fixed Effects Estimator for the Effect of Receiving an ARRA Grants on
Renewable Energy Net Generation
(1)
ARRA Grant

(2)

(3)

(4)

44.553***
(11.88)

ARRA Grant L1

59.332***
(11.26)

ARRA Grant L2

81.512***
(11.65)

ARRA Grant L3
0.789***
(0.09)
-0.003
(0.02)
-0.002***
(0.00)
0.026
(0.05)
6.457***
(1.57)
-24.594***
(8.50)
-14.295
(10.19)
-0.002***
(0.00)

0.795***
(0.09)
-0.001
(0.02)
-0.002***
(0.00)
0.014
(0.05)
6.486***
(1.56)
-23.983***
(8.48)
-13.602
(10.19)
-0.002***
(0.00)
(8.19)

0.797***
(0.09)
0.000
(0.02)
-0.002***
(0.00)
0.003
(0.05)
6.567***
(1.56)
-23.611***
(8.47)
-13.042
(10.18)
-0.002***
(0.00)
(8.19)

118.769***
(13.45)
0.795***
(0.09)
-0.000
(0.02)
-0.002***
(0.00)
-0.002
(0.05)
6.636***
(1.56)
-22.299***
(8.46)
-13.233
(10.16)
-0.002***
(0.00)
(8.20)

Constant

863.687***
(269.90)

796.110***
(267.39)

784.843***
(267.08)

744.939***
(266.72)

Year Effects
Fixed Effects

Y
Y

RE Production
FF Energy Production
Income Per Capita
Population
Unemployment
July Max Temp
RPS or RE Goal
State RE Production

Observations
R-squared
Adjusted R-squared

Y
Y

12171
0.025
-0.169

12171
0.026
-0.168

Y
Y

12171
0.028
-0.165

Y
Y

12171
0.031
-0.162

Standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

ARRA grant and the lagged ARRA grant variables are positive and significant at
the one percent level in each model. However, the magnitude of the coefficient on ARRA
grant increases with each lagged variable. The results in Table 6.6 suggest that counties
with an ARRA grant recipient significantly increased solar energy production after
receiving an ARRA renewable energy grant, all else equal, but the impact became greater
over time. This finding could suggest that counties were quickly able to implement some
solar energy projects but continued to develop solar energy over time. Looking at Model
(4), receiving an ARRA energy grant is associated with an increase in 118,000 net
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megawatt hours from solar energy at the county-level, all else equal. According to the
U.S. Energy Information Administration, the average household consumed 10.4 MWH in
2017 (“How much electricity,” 2019). Therefore, an increase at an estimated 118,000
MWH could potentially power approximately 11,346 homes per year at this usage rate.
Some control variables in the models are significant too. The total amount of
renewable energy production in a county is significant at the one percent level and
positive across all four models.55 Since solar energy production is included in total
renewable energy production, the result implies that counties do not substitute away from
other forms of renewable energy when solar energy production increases, all else equal.
The total amount of fossil fuel energy produced in a county is not significant and has a
coefficient close to 0 across all four models, suggesting that counties do not substitute
away from fossil fuel energy when solar energy production increases. However, it could
mean that counties producing solar energy do not produce a significant amount of fossil
fuel energy.
Population density and the average July maximum temperature for counties were
included to control for energy demand. Population is not significant, suggesting that solar
energy does not change in response to changes in the number of people in an area. This
result could be expected if the majority of counties are not solely dependent on solar
energy as a primary source of energy given that the renewable energy market is not fully
developed. July max temp is significant at the one percent level and negative. This
suggests that solar energy production decreases as a county experiences higher

55

County-level total renewable energy production and solar energy production have a correlation
coefficient of nine percent.
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temperature in the summer. This result is unexpected but could suggest that counties rely
on other forms of developed energy as weather becomes more extreme. It is unclear if
this finding is caused by spurious correlation; this variable is not a sufficient measure of
weather; or if counties tend to rely on other forms of energy when experiencing
increasing temperatures.
The two county-level economic variables are significant at the one percent level.
Income per capita is negative, suggesting that counties with less income are less likely to
produce solar energy. This result could indicate that counties with more limited income
are less able to afford the upfront costs associated with renewable energy development.
The unemployment rate is positively associated with solar energy production, possibly
implying that counties utilize solar energy projects as a means for economic
development. However, both findings warrant additional research to imply causality.
Only one of the two state-level variables are significant. State energy production
is significantly and negatively related to solar energy production. This finding is
inconsistent with expectations and could imply that counties in areas, including states,
with underdeveloped renewable energy markets were targeted with ARRA energy grants,
which was the way the program was designed. Whether the state in which the county is
located has a renewable portfolio standard or goal is not significantly associated with
solar energy production. The fixed effects are informative too as they explain 68 to 71
percent of the variance in each model, suggesting that unobserved characteristics specific
to each county explain the majority of solar energy production.
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I also consider the impact of counties receiving multiple ARRA awards. ARRA
grants measures the cumulative number of ARRA renewable energy grants received by a
county as of time t. As with the previous models, I lag the cumulative number of awards
by one year in Model 2, two years in Model 3, and three years in Model 4. The results are
in Table 6.7. Each model includes both fixed and year effects.
Table 6.7
Fixed Effects Estimator for the Effect of the Number of ARRA Grants on
Renewable Energy Net Generation
(1)
ARRA Grants

(2)

(3)

ARRA Grants L1

5.573**
(2.31)

ARRA Grants L2

7.146***
(2.35)

ARRA Grants L3
RE Production
FF Energy Production
Income Per Capita
Population
Unemployment
July Max Temp
RPS or RE Goal
State RE Production

Constant
Year Effects
Fixed Effects
Observations
R-squared
Adjusted R-squared

(4)

4.726*
(2.49)

0.787***
(0.09)
-0.004
(0.02)
-0.002***
(0.00)
0.044
(0.05)
6.443***
(1.57)
-23.376***
(8.49)
-14.076
(10.20)
-0.002***
(0.00)
830.498***
(269.86)

Y
Y

0.788***
(0.09)
-0.004
(0.02)
-0.002***
(0.00)
0.042
(0.05)
6.424***
(1.57)
-23.058***
(8.49)
-13.942
(10.20)
-0.002***
(0.00)
820.909***
(269.83)

Y
Y

12171
0.024
-0.170

12171
0.024
-0.170

0.789***
(0.09)
-0.004
(0.02)
-0.002***
(0.00)
0.041
(0.05)
6.430***
(1.57)
-23.014***
(8.49)
-13.858
(10.20)
-0.002***
(0.00)
819.717***
(269.78)

Y
Y
12171
0.024
-0.170

8.128***
(2.66)
0.788***
(0.09)
-0.004
(0.02)
-0.002***
(0.00)
0.042
(0.05)
6.435***
(1.57)
-22.964***
(8.49)
-13.961
(10.20)
-0.002***
(0.00)
818.383***
(269.79)

Y
Y
12171
0.024
-0.170

Standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

The results show that both the time required for implementation and the
magnitude of ARRA renewable energy grants might be relevant for solar energy
production. Each grant represents a new project funded within a county. The cumulative
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number of ARRA renewable energy grants is positive and significant in all four models,
but the significance increases with the lagged variables. The coefficient on ARRA Grants
is significant at the 10 percent level in Model 1; at the five percent level in Model 2; and
at the one percent level in the other two models. We can infer from the results that the
number of projects funded within a county could have had a greater positive impact on
solar energy production after the first two years of receiving a grant, all else equal. This
result suggests that there could be delays in project implementation. The coefficient also
increases with each subsequent lag. By the fourth year (Model 4), each additional ARRA
grant is associated with an increase in 8,128 MWH of net solar energy production, all
else equal. Using the calculation above, this amount of solar energy could potentially
power 782 homes at the average household usage rate.

6.7 Robustness Checks
As discussed in Chapter Two, all states have potential for some at least solar photovoltaic
(PV) power energy, although the potential for solar PV varies by region. I consider this
variation to test the validity of the results in Table 6.6. I consider whether the
effectiveness of ARRA energy grants on solar energy production is driven by solar
energy-producing counties that are more able to develop solar energy. Solar potential
varies greatly by region. The previous model controls for county fixed effects but does
not provide information about the effectiveness of ARRA energy grants in different
climate regions. I evaluate the effectiveness of energy grants by climate region using data
from the U.S. Department of Energy’s Building Technologies Office (Baechler et al.,
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2015).56 The office groups counties into one of eight climate regions based on heating
degree days, average temperatures, and precipitation. Due to data limitations with the
frequency of ARRA awards, I put counties into one of two groups based on climate
region. The first group includes counties in hot climate regions, which are the hot-dry,
mixed-dry, hot-humid, and mixed-humid climate regions. The second group includes
counties in cold climate regions, which are the cold, very cold, marine, and subarctic
climate regions. Each group includes both counties that received an ARRA renewable
energy grant and counties that did not receive an ARRA energy grant.
I run the model on the two groups of counties separately using solar energy net
generation (MWH) as the dependent variable. I use the first ARRA grants measure equal
to 1 in the year in which a county received an ARRA grant and subsequent years, lagged
by one year. Therefore, both models are the same except for the sample of counties in
each model. Figure 6.11 shows the differences in the estimated impacts of receiving an
ARRA energy grant on solar energy production for counties in hot climate regions
compared to counties in cold climate regions.

56

The Building Technologies Office publishes this guide for home builders through the U.S. Department of
Energy’s Building America Program. There are other programs and data sources for climate regions that
are defined differently.
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Figure 6.11
The Effect of Receiving an ARRA Renewable Energy Grant on
Hot Climate Zones Versus Cold Climate Zones

Dividing the data by climate region shows differences for the impact of ARRA
grants on solar energy production. Receiving an ARRA grant is not significantly related
to solar energy production in counties located in cold climate zones, but it is significantly
related to solar energy production in counties in hot climate zones. Counties in hot
climate zones likely have more natural resources to develop solar energy. This could
imply that those counties are better able to utilize ARRA grants to produce solar energy
relative to producers in colder climate areas. However, this could also suggest that these
counties also had stronger preferences for ARRA energy grants, although these
preferences do not necessarily reduce the effectiveness of ARRA energy grants.
However, the binary measure of climate region does not completely capture the nuances
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of different climate conditions. Future analyses could more fully explore the impact of
energy grants by region and the role of preferences as data become available.
I also consider regional climate policy efforts that could have impacted energy
production. There were regional efforts by groups of states to develop renewable energy
before the distribution of ARRA grants. Three notable regional efforts include the
Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) of 2009 by nine states to cap carbon dioxide
emissions; the Western Climate Initiative (WCI) of 2007 by California and Canadian
provinces to implement a cap and trade program; and the Pacific Coast Collaborative
(PCC) of 2008 by four states to develop renewable energy (“Multi-State Initiatives,”
2019). I test the effect of the lagged ARRA grant variable on solar energy production for
counties in states that are members of each climate initiative. I also compare counties in
states that were involved in any of the three climate initiatives to counties in states that
were not involved in any of the three initiatives. Figure 6.12 shows the differences in the
estimated impacts of receiving an ARRA energy grant on solar energy production for
counties located in states involved in one of the three climate initiatives and non-member
states.
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Figure 6.12
The Effect of Receiving an ARRA Renewable Energy Grant
in States with a Regional Climate Initiative and Non-Member States

The coefficient plot above shows that ARRA grants do not have a statistically
significant impact on solar energy production in counties located in member states of any
of the three individual climate initiatives. However, the results may be restricted by the
sample size.57 The figure also shows the results for counties located within any member
state compared to counties not located within a member state. The coefficient on ARRA
grants is positively related to solar energy production in both models. 58 The result is

57

The model for RGI has 910 observations, and the models for WCI and PCC have 378 and 778
observations, respectively.
58
The member states model has 1,688 observations, and the non-member states model has 10,483
observations. Approximately seven percent of counties in the member states model had an ARRA grant
recipient, and approximately 15 percent of counties in the non-member states model had an ARRA grant
recipient.
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significant at the five percent level in the member states model and one percent level in
the non-member states model, although this could also be caused by the increased sample
size in the non-member states model. Therefore, the results do not suggest that regional
climate efforts to increase renewable energy production impacted the effectiveness of
ARRA grants. This result, along with the results for state energy policies in the previous
section, suggest that solar energy production continues to be highly decentralized in the
U.S.

6.8 Conclusions
This chapter studies the effectiveness of one-time Section §1603 ARRA grants for
renewable energy on solar energy net generation in counties. I hypothesized that
renewable energy grants would have a positive and significant impact on solar energy
production at the local level, which is supported by the findings and robustness checks.
The results from a panel data model using power-producing counties from 2005 to 2014
suggest that receiving an ARRA grant increases solar energy net generation. The results
also suggest that the magnitude increases over time and with the number of energy grants
received. The robustness checks also suggest that grants may be more effective in hotter
climate regions, which are expected to have more natural resources for solar energy but
may also have recipients with stronger preferences for solar energy grants. The findings
also suggest that local energy development is not tied to state or regional initiatives,
implying that the effectiveness is tied to local implementation.
This chapter contributes to literature on grant effectiveness by using physical
output as the dependent variable instead of local spending on energy. This is perhaps a
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more precise measure to analyze the effectiveness of renewable energy grants, because
the amount spent on renewable energy might not be strongly correlated with energy
output. Both the amount spent on renewable energy and renewable energy capacity can
vary by region, source, and technology. This chapter also contributes to the energy
literature by utilizing a unique dataset to overcome an area of limited research. Data on
renewable energy grants and spending are not typically reported or centrally collected. 59
The findings in this chapter raise warrant considerations for future research on
renewable energy grants. First, there are factors specific to ARRA’s Section §1603 grants
that might affect the generalizability of the results in this chapter. This program was
implemented one time as part of a stimulus package following the economic recession of
2007 to 2009. While I control for economic conditions, there might be other economic
factors or factors specific to the ARRA energy grant program that could impact the
results. In this case, the results might not be generalizable to other types of energy grant
programs, especially grants distributed annually through existing programs.
The findings also raise questions about how implementation of ARRA’s energy
grant program impacted grant effectiveness. ARRA required the DOE’s Office of Energy
Efficiency and Renewable Energy to “actively monitor” the progress of each grantfunded project (“American Recovery and Reinvestment Act Program Plan,” 2009). We
should expect the effectiveness of the program to be positively associated with the extent
to which the Department of Energy monitored each project’s progress. However,

59

Data on grants through the Department of Energy’s State Energy Program are reported annually.
However, these data are combined with grants for energy efficiency and are available only at the statelevel. These data also do not include other grants for renewable energy through the Department of
Energy or other federal agencies.
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monitoring requirements likely vary by program and the type of grant, suggesting that
effectiveness might depend on implementation and metrics used to evaluate
effectiveness.
Finally, some measures used in this study limited the ability to evaluate grant
effectiveness. Although studying direct output is one contribution of this chapter, using
renewable energy production as the dependent variable also limits the analysis. First, I
am unable to determine whether federal funds crowded out local spending on renewable
energy projects, even though the fixed effects likely capture some local preferences that
lead to crowding out. Second, I use only one measure of energy production, net
generation in megawatt hours. This measure takes into account the losses in energy
production that occur from producing energy. Other measures exist, although some are
not available for power plants. For example, total generation in megawatt hours and total
energy production in BTUs are two alternative measures of energy production. Therefore,
findings on grant effectiveness might vary based on the measure of renewable energy
output.
The analysis in this chapter also raises additional research questions not specific
to ARRA energy grants. This study considers the effect of renewable energy grants
primarily for only one type of renewable energy, solar energy. This area of research is
rich with additional questions that relate to decentralization and grant effectiveness.
Future studies could explore the role of positive externalities from renewable energy
production on the net aggregate effect of renewable energy production. Although
renewable energy appeared to increase at the local level in counties with a grant recipient,
did neighboring counties reduce energy production in response to positive spillovers?
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What aggregate impact did the observed increase in renewable energy production have on
aggregate renewable energy production? Future studies could also consider how grants
interact with other local renewable energy policies and efforts, such as tax incentives and
regulations.
The following concluding chapter provides an overview of the dissertation and
briefly discusses contributions from each chapter. The chapter concludes with
suggestions for future research.
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CHAPTER SEVEN: CONCLUSIONS
7.1 Overview
This dissertation sought to explain why renewable energy provision remains
decentralized in the United States despite large spillovers associated with renewable
energy output. The focus on how institutional incentives affect funding choices offers an
explanation as to why good provision may deviate from the optimal outcome suggested
by normative economic theory. The approach builds on current literature by considering a
legislator’s initial choice of funding mechanism for good provision instead of evaluating
the optimal outcome. This perspective helps to us to further understand the nuances in
public funding decisions. This dissertation also contributes to energy policy studies by
focusing on federal involvement in the decentralization of renewable energy in the United
States, a perspective not currently considered in the literature. This approach connects the
federal government’s actions to support decentralized development to subnational efforts
to adopt renewable energy in the United States.
Chapter Four constructs a theoretical model to explain how institutional
incentives affect legislators’ decisions on whether to support decentralized or centralized
funding for goods. The model builds on current literature to include political price in the
constraint on legislators’ choices. Political price is loosely defined as the costs associated
with passing a certain level of public good provision. The model treats the funding
decision as the variable to show how the magnitude of the political price associated with
decision making can affect a legislator’s choice of decentralized or centralized good
provision. The model shows that legislators can maximize their utility by choosing fiscal
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transfers to fund decentralized renewable energy output when the political price of
centralized renewable energy policymaking is high.
The simple theoretical model proposed in Chapter Four contributes to current
literature by putting forth a different perspective to explain how institutional factors can
lead legislators make decisions that deviate from normative economic theory. The
perspective in this chapter is used to explain the unique case of renewable energy.
However, the findings should not be limited to renewable energy, as suggested by the
reference to previously decentralized education policy provision. A key component of the
model is the consideration of political price, which extends beyond the monetary price
typically used in constraint functions.
Chapter Five offers a direct empirical evaluation of the theoretical model
proposed in Chapter Four by asking whether low political price of renewable energy
policymaking decreases the probability that a legislator proposes a bill for decentralized
funding for renewable energy. I created a proxy for low political price: whether Congress
and the bill sponsor were majority Democrat at the time a legislator makes a funding
decision. The findings show support for the hypothesis that legislators are less likely to
propose funding for decentralized renewable energy when the political price is low. A
robustness check finds weak support that legislators are more likely to propose funding
for centralized renewable energy when political price is low.
Chapter Five explores the direct link between political price and funding
decisions by analyzing data on decisions that have not been previously explored by the
literature in this context. It considers the initial decision to choose a funding mechanism
subject to the institutional constraints inherent in the policymaking process. This
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perspective furthers our understanding of how the political price of a specific policy issue
can affect legislative decisions on type of good provision. Additionally, it contributes to
energy policy studies by explaining renewable energy grant distribution, which has been
understudied in the literature. Future studies can enhance the discussion on political price
by pondering a more specific definition.
Chapter Six provides a follow-up empirical analysis to further understand
motivation to use renewable energy grants by evaluating renewable energy grant
effectiveness. The empirical evaluation is based on the hypothesis that renewable energy
grants increase renewable energy output at the local level and utilizes data on solar
energy production aggregated at the county level. Findings suggest that localities with a
renewable energy grant have significant increases in solar energy production, all else
equal. This implies that renewable energy grants can be effective at the local level at
generating small amounts of renewable energy, although the results are based on onetime, large sums of money relative to other renewable energy grant programs.
Chapter six offers additional support why legislators support decentralized
renewable energy output even if it is not the most efficient way to increase renewable
energy output by showing a positive association between grants and output at the local
level. This analysis further contributes to grant effectiveness studies in energy policy by
connecting grants to county-level energy production, an approach not currently explored
in renewable energy studies.
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7.2 Considerations for Future Research
The findings in this dissertation also raise several questions for future research. First, this
dissertation focuses on legislators as the key actors in the policymaking process. The
perspective considered here was necessary to explore decentralized funding for
renewable energy but does not discount the significance of other actors in the
policymaking process. Other actors could include the President, interest groups, other
legislators, and legislative staff. For example, Hudak (2014) discusses the President’s role
in influencing the grant distribution process through bureaucratic control. Bordignon et
al. (2008) evaluates social welfare under centralization and decentralization after
accounting for lobbying interests. Future analyses could consider how the President or
lobbyists influences legislators’ initial decisions to propose a grant program or by clearly
incorporating these actors into the political price variable.
The research in this dissertation also raises questions about what type of
centralized renewable energy would be optimal. This dissertation focuses on
decentralized renewable energy policy given the assumption that centralized renewable
energy policy could more efficiently account for large, positive externalities resulting
from renewable energy production. Even though normative theory makes a case for
federal action, it is not necessarily clear that standard approaches to centralized policy in
other countries would be optimal solutions for the U.S. As stated in Chapter Two, the
predominant type of renewable energy resource varies by region, and different types of
renewable energy resources are developed differently. Furthermore, the costs of
renewable energy development vary by source, technology, and region (“Updated Capital
Cost Estimate,” 2016). Therefore, the efficiency of any centralized renewable energy
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policy in the United States would be jointly determined by the degree to which
heterogeneous jurisdictions were considered and the effectiveness of equalizing
spillovers from local renewable energy production.
Similar to Wallis and Oates (1988), who measure the overall optimal degree of
centralized spending, future analyses could consider the optimal amount of centralized
renewable energy policy spending or policy output specifically. Oates and Portney (2003)
provide guidelines for environmental policy provision by suggesting national intervention
for disproportionate spillovers, arguing that the federal government could intervene to
disseminate information and support research. They recommend local control over setting
standards and establishing their own programs when benefits of those programs are
contained within their respective jurisdictions. However, his logic applies when activities
are not contained. As we have seen from other centralized policies, such as the Clean Air
Act, centralized standards can be met with an element of local control. In this example,
the federal government set minimum requirements for air quality and pollution
restrictions but provided options for local governments to meet these requirements. 60
One challenge with any future centralized energy policy will be implementing
federal control over a policy area where state and local governments have been actively
individually adopting renewable energy policy (Keeler, 2007). As discussed in Chapter
One, subnational governments have been policies such as financial incentives and
regulations to promote renewable energy development. However, any centralized policy
does not have to preempt subnational efforts. Another challenge might be implementing
centralized renewable energy policy in a country with a developed fossil fuel industry. It

60

The Clean Air Act (42 U.S.C. §7401 et seq. (1970)) is a centralized policy that permits the U.S.
Environmental Agency to set, enforce, and monitor national pollution standards.
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is unclear from the literature if renewable energy and fossil fuels are complete substitutes.
Owen (2006) argues that renewable energy would be competitive with traditional fossil
fuel energy if fossil fuel energy included negative externalities in the price of fossil fuel,
although natural gas is more competitive than both renewable energy and fossil fuel in
terms of price. Future studies on renewable energy development can further advance the
literature by fully considering the role of the federal and subnational governments in
renewable energy provision, especially as renewable energy development progresses in
the U.S.
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Appendix A
Location of Renewable Energy Power Plants by Source
Biomass Energy Power Plants

U.S. Energy Mapping System, U.S. Energy Information Administration
Geothermal Energy Power Plants

U.S. Energy Mapping System, U.S. Energy Information Administration
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Hydroelectric Energy Power Plants

U.S. Energy Mapping System, U.S. Energy Information Administration

Solar Energy Power Plants

U.S. Energy Mapping System, U.S. Energy Information Administration
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Wind Energy Power Plants

U.S. Energy Mapping System, U.S. Energy Information Administration
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Appendix B
Summary Statistics 1
Mean
0.1
0.2
0.1
0.4
11.8
0.2
0.5
6.2
2.4
0.4
0.3
3.2
3.4
1008

Decentralized Funding for RE
Low Political Price
Centralized Funding for RE
Mentions Fossil Fuel Energy
Cosponsors
Bipartisan Support
Democratic Sponsor
Chamber Seniority
Committee Seniority
Energy Committee Member
RE Production Per Cap
FF Energy Production Per Cap
Energy Consumption Per Cap
Observations
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Max
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
230.0
1.0
1.0
27.0
26.0
1.0
2.2
194.4
11.8

Min
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
1.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
1.8

Appendix C
Summary Statistics 2

mean

max

min

ARRA Grant
ARRA Grants
RE Production
Sun Energy Production
FF Energy Production
Income Per Capita
Population
Unemployment
July Max Temp
RPS or RE Goal
State RE Production

0
0
2409
21
20292
38229
286
7
31
1
15330

1
51
368950
17964
606620
199813
48400
29
42
1
110000

0
0
-11292
0
-2629
16664
0
1
20
0
4

Observations

17954
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